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ABSTRACT
Gender diversity in corporate governance is a highly debated
issue worldwide. National campaigns such as “2020 Women on
Boards” in the United States and “Women on the Board Pledge
for Europe” are examples of just two initiatives aimed at increasing female representation in the corporate boardroom. Several
European countries have adopted board quotas as a means toward achieving gender diversity. Japan has passed an Act on
Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the
Workplace to lay a foundation for establishing targets for promoting women.
This Article examines the status of women in positions of
leadership in the United States, several major countries in the
European Union, and Japan. We focus on the legal backdrop in
each jurisdiction regarding gender discrimination and studies
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tending to demonstrate the economic benefits of gender diversity.
We conclude that although important steps have been taken in
the direction of narrowing the gender gap in all jurisdictions examined, progress has been slow and difficult across the board.
The issue of too few women at the top will not be resolved until
there is a wider acceptance that female leaders can benefit their
organizations and contribute to social and economic progress.
Moreover, the presence of women on corporate boards is valuable
in and of itself and the status quo ought to be further challenged
in international business.
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Introduction
Gender diversity on corporate boards is a highly debated issue
worldwide. In addition to providing equal opportunity, promoting
equality and inclusion of women in positions of leadership is believed to
have positive effects on the financial performance of a company. Na1
tional campaigns such as “2020 Women on Boards” in the U.S. or
2
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” in the E.U. are just two examples of initiatives that aim to increase female representation in boardrooms. Rising female representation on boards has been identified as a
3
trend for 2020, while board configuration is considered to be a “strate4
gic resource of the organization.” The European Commission has
stressed the economic importance of gender diversity on corporate
boards, quoting several studies showing correlations between women’s
5
presence on boards and various improved financial metrics. Japan’s Act
on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the
Workplace, enacted in 2016, lays a foundation for establishing targets
6
for promoting women to decision-making positions. Furthermore, we
agree with those who argue that the status quo ought to be challenged in
international business, both in terms of economic importance and for
7
considerations of equal opportunity and fairness.
This Article compares gender issues in corporate leadership among
the United States, a sampling of countries in the European Union, and
Japan. There are multiple reasons for this selection of jurisdictions for
our comparative analysis. First, all three jurisdictions reflect highly developed industrial powers with well-established corporate cultures. Sec1. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 2 (2018), https://www.
2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2018_FINAL.pdf.
2. European Commission Memoranda/11/124, EU Justice Commissioner Reding Challenges Business Leaders to Increase Women’s Presence on Corporate Boards with
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” (March 1, 2011).
3. Pedro Nuendo, 10 Trends for the Board of 2020, 29 IESE INSIGHT 45, 47 – 48
(2016).
4. CB. Ingley & N.T. van der Walt, Board Configuration: Building Better Boards, 3
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5, 5 (2003).
5. Progress Report on Women in Economic Decision-Making in the EU, at 7 (2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf.
6. Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace,
Act No. 64 of September 4, 2015, (Japan), translated in An Act on Promotion of
Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace (Tentative Translation),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=3018.
7. See Patrizia Zanoni et al., Editorial, Unpacking Diversity, Grasping Inequality: Rethinking Difference Through Critical Perspectives, 17(1) ORGANIZATION 9, 9 – 11, 20
(2012).
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ond, each jurisdiction has a noteworthy history of tackling the problems
of gender equality and a more or less established recognition of women’s
potential to contribute to the economic and social development of their
countries. Finally, despite the industrial progress of these jurisdictions,
none of them can boast of creating a sufficiently supportive environment for women to rise to positions of leadership.
We begin in Section I with an examination of the status of women
in positions of leadership in the United States, various countries in the
European Union, and Japan. Section II continues with analysis of the
legal backdrop regarding gender discrimination and efforts to eradicate
it. In Section III, we offer some proposals for reform. Concluding
remarks follow.
I. Women in Positions of Leadership
This Section examines the status of women in positions of leadership in the United States, various countries in the European Union, and
Japan. As discussed below, although opportunities for women to advance in firms have risen in all these jurisdictions in recent years, the environment for women aspiring to positions of leadership leaves much to
be desired.
A. The United States
The United States has historically seen low female representation in
corporate leadership roles. Although female gains have been accelerating
8
in recent years, women remain underrepresented on corporate boards.
Greater progress has been made, however, regarding managerial and
other leadership positions: a slight majority of all American manage9
ment and professional positions are held by women, but this is not
without caveats, which are discussed below. This Section examines the
history and current status of women on boards and in management in
the United States, including current statistics, trends, and a review of
proposed causes of disparities.

8. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1.
9. John Baker & Joseph Canegmi, Why Are There So Few Women CEOs and Senior
Leaders in Corporate America?, ORGANIZATIONAL DEV. J., 2016, at 31, 33.

284

michigan journal of gender

&

law

[Vol. 26:279

1. Women on Corporate Boards
Although women served on American corporate boards as early as
10
1900, they still remain a small minority. As of 2017, women held 24.4
percent of board seats within Fortune 100 firms, and just over 20 per11
cent across the Fortune 1000. Seven percent of firms in the Fortune
12
1000 had no female board members. Progress has been rapid—
between 2011 and 2017, the proportion of firms with at least 20 percent female board members rose from 29 percent to well over half—but
13
gender parity is still a long way off. Importantly, the increase in female
membership on American corporate boards is often the result of adding
14
new board seats rather than existing members being replaced, raising
15
concerns that women may simply be added to boards as tokens. Effectively, growth in female representation may be somewhat artificial if
preexisting board seats remain male.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that it could
16
take four decades for parity to be reached if present trends continue,
with smaller firms especially lagging behind. The boards of the 500
smallest firms within the Fortune 1000 have six percent fewer women
17
than the Fortune 100, at only 18.8 percent versus 24.4 percent. Six
percent of firms in the Russell 1000, another index of American firms,
have all-male boards, a number that grows to 21 percent among the
Russell 3000, illustrating the greater lack of board diversity among
18
smaller firms.
There are also significant disparities in board gender diversity
across industries. Among the Fortune 1000, real estate firms have the
highest average proportion of women on boards, at 23.1 percent, com19
pared to only 14 percent on energy industry boards. The technology
sector has received special attention for its lack of gender diversity:
10. Phyllis King, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Spotlighting Wisconsin, 32 WIS. J.
L. GENDER, & SOC’Y 1, 7 (2017).
11. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jan Luca Pletzer et al., Does Gender Matter? Female Representation on Corporate Boards and Firm Financial Performance - A Meta-Analysis, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 4
(2015).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Brianna Castro, Raising the Stakes on Board Gender Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., 1, 2 (2019).
19. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1.
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among the SV 150, an index of major Silicon Valley firms, 80 percent
have one or zero female board members, compared to 18 percent among
20
S&P 500 firms. The disparities suggest that solutions might need to be
tailored to specific industries.
2. Women in Management
Compared with corporate boards, management has historically
seen more equal representation, with women holding nearly 40 percent
21
of all managerial roles in the U.S. in 2018, a figure largely unchanged
22
since 2015. Women also have taken up the bulk of new management
positions: of 4.5 million new management jobs created between 1980
23
and 2010, women took 2.6 million, or about 58 percent. The proportion of women falls, however, as one moves further up the managerial
ladder: among S&P 500 companies, women make up 44.7 percent of
the total workforce, 36.9 percent of line managers, 26.5 percent of sen24
ior level managers, and only five percent of CEOs. Women are so underrepresented in the executive suite that just six female CEOs leaving
their firms in 2018 caused the total number of female CEOs among
25
Fortune 500 companies to drop by 25 percent. In North America, the
year 2018 saw a drop in the proportion of senior roles being held by
26
women (down to 21 percent from 23 percent), although the proportion of businesses with at least one woman in senior management did
27
jump from 69 percent to 81 percent over the same one-year period.
Female managers were also most common in certain “female-

20. FENWICK & WEST LLP, GENDER DIVERSITY IN SILICON VALLEY 9 (2014),
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Gender_Diversity_2014.pdf.
21. Women in Management: Quick Take, CATALYST RESEARCH (2019), https://www.
catalyst.org/research/women-in-management/.
22. 39 Percent of Managers in 2015 Were Women, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS:
TED: THE ECONOMICS DAILY (August 1, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2016/39-percent-of-managers-in-2015-were-women.htm.
23. William Scarborough, What the Data Says About Women in Management Between
1980 and 2010, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/whatthe-data-says-about-women-in-management-between-1980-and-2010.
24. Women in Management, supra note 21.
25. Emily Stewart, Women Are Running for Office in Record Numbers. In Corporate America, They’re Losing Ground., VOX (June 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/6/8/17413254/women-fortune-500-ceos-politics-blue-wave.
26. GRANT THORNTON, WOMEN IN BUSINESS: BEYOND POLICY TO PROGRESS 8 (2018),
https://www.grantthornton.co.ke/globalassets/1.-member-firms/kenya/insights/pdf/
grant-thornton-women-in-business-2018-report-edited-web.pdf.
27. Id.
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specialized” areas, with over 70 percent of managers in human resources
28
and medical and health services being female. In general, managerial
positions have become more segregated, so that “female managers are
concentrated in fields that emphasize people-centered caring skills, while
men are concentrated in fields dealing with production-centered
29
skills.” Although there are improvements, there are still troubling
trends.
3. Explanations for Disparities
A diverse literature has developed in recent decades to explain disparities between the success of women as compared to men in rising to
positions of corporate leadership. This section addresses some reasons
for the disparities.
Given the popularity of the term “glass ceiling” and its pervasiveness in contemporary popular discourse, it is worth clarifying what it
means. One comprehensive study defines it as the phenomenon where
“gender (or other) disadvantages are stronger at the top of the hierarchy
than at lower levels and that these disadvantages become worse later in a
30
person’s career.” The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission defined it as
31
“artificial barriers to the advancement of women and minorities.” The
first individual to have used the term, Marilyn Loden, has written that
the glass ceiling consists of “the barriers to advancement [of women]
32
that were cultural and not personal.” Using more strictly defined em33
pirical criteria, one study found strong evidence of a significant gender
penalty among those later in their careers and higher up in their organi34
zation. Other studies have noted that, although most research focuses
on internal promotion patterns, external recruitment practices may also
35
play a role, especially in the technology sector. In addition to overt dis28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

Women in Management, supra note 21.
Scarborough, supra note 23.
See David A. Cotter et al., The Glass Ceiling Effect, 80 SOC. FORCES 655 (2001).
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GLASS CEILING COMMISSION - GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING
FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995).
Marilyn Loden, 100 Women: ‘Why I Invented the Glass Ceiling Phrase,’ BBC NEWS
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-42026266.
Cotter et al., supra note 30, at 657 (“In practice, this means that glass ceilings are
measured as the residual differences due to race or gender after controlling for education, experience, abilities, motivation, and other job-relevant characteristics.”).
Id. at 655.
See Roberto M. Fernandez & Santiago Campero, Gender Sorting and the Glass Ceiling
in High-Tech Firms, 70 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (2017) (identifying patterns in
external hiring processes in 443 small-to-medium-sized firms in the technology sector
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crimination, studies have examined a range of other factors as contrib36
uting to the glass ceiling phenomenon.
Alongside the “glass ceiling,” the term “glass cliff” has become
popular recently: it is a phenomenon where women CEOs disproportionately find themselves in charge of firms in imminent danger of fail37
ing. Specifically, “women who break through the glass ceiling into the
upper echelons of management [tend] to be placed in more precarious
38
leadership positions than men,” which would account for the relatively
39
poorer performance of female CEOs observed by some commentators.
The phenomenon has received significant attention since it was first
proposed in 2007, and a recent review of the growing literature found
that a “decade of research into the glass cliff confirms that it is a robust
and pervasive phenomenon and a significant feature of the organization40
al landscape for women who achieve high office.” Therefore, many
women in CEO positions within the U.S. face an additional challenge
41
in maintaining the firm’s performance and their own reputation.
Implicit biases that hold back women leaders have received more
attention recently, particularly the role of stereotypes. Characteristics
deemed important in leaders, and indeed, leadership in general, are culturally associated with masculinity within the United States, meaning
that women in leadership positions are essentially in “gender-stereotype-

36.

37.

38.
39.

40.
41.

to find that the seeds of the glass ceiling are evident in candidate pools, as women
seek entry-level jobs more than they do executive positions or stereotypically male
IT/engineering positions and men are more likely than women to be interviewed, receive offers, and be hired).
See Marianne Bertrand, Coase Lecture - The Glass Ceiling, 85 ECONOMICA 205 (2018)
(reviewing scholarship that attributes the gender gap to gender-based psychological
attributes, competing demands on women’s time in the workplace and at home,
women’s need for greater flexibility in the workplace, and penalties associated with
such flexibility).
See, e.g., Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dynamics Surrounding the Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions, 32
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 549 (2007).
Id. at 563.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Judge, Women on Board: Help or Hindrance?, TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2003), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/women-on-board-help-orhindrance-2c6fnqf6fng (noting that companies with female board leadership underperformed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index, whereas companies
with male board leadership outperformed the index).
Michelle K. Ryan et al., Getting on Top of the Glass Cliff: Reviewing a Decade of Evidence, Explanations, and Impact, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 446, 453 (2016).
Christy Glass & Alison Cook, Leading at the Top: Understanding Women’s Challenges
Above the Glass Ceiling, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 51, 59 – 60 (2016).
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42

incongruent” positions. Women face the choice of displaying stereotypically masculine characteristics and being judged as cold or excessively argumentative, or, alternatively, of conforming to female stereotypes
43
and being judged as too emotional or as poor leaders.
In addition, one study found that although greater power increased
total amount of time spent talking for men, this effect did not appear
44
for women —indeed, women seem to suffer backlash from speaking
45
up. A similar strand of stereotype research has found that women face
backlash when engaging in self-promotion (although they are not pun46
ished for peer-promoting.) Self-promotion “violates female gender ste47
reotypes yet is necessary for professional success.” This conclusion is
especially important for women to consider, as much popular literature
advocates for women to engage in these more “masculine” behaviors to
48
49
achieve career success, without consideration of these backlash effects.

42. See Victoria L. Brescoll, et al., Hard Won and Easily Lost: The Fragile Status of Leaders
in Gender-Stereotype-Incongruent Occupations, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1640 (2010); Anne
M. Koenig, et al., Are Leader Stereotypes Masculine? A Meta-Analysis of Three Research
Paradigms, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 616 (2011).
43. Brescoll et al., supra note 42, at 1642; See also Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis
Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead?: Status Conferral, Gender, and Expression
of Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268 (2008) (stating that “men who
expressed anger in professional settings were more likely to be hired than men who
expressed sadness and were also given more status, power, and independence in their
jobs . . . professional women who express anger may experience a decrease, rather
than an increase, in their status. Women are expected to be kinder and more modest
than men, and they evoke negative responses from other people if they fail to conform to this prescriptive stereotype”); Gary N. Powell, D. Anthony Butterfield &
Jane D. Parent, Gender and Managerial Stereotypes: Have the Times Changed?, 28 J. OF
MGMT. 177, 178 (2002) (stating that male characteristics include “assertiveness, independence, and willingness to take risks”).
44. Victoria L. Brescoll, Who Takes the Floor and Why: Gender, Power, and Volublity in
Organizations, 56 Admin Sci. Q. 622, 622 (2011).
45. Women Face Backlash for Speaking Up at Work, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI.
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/minds-business/womenface-backlash-for-speaking-up-at-work.html.
46. Corinne A. Moss-Racusin & Laurie A. Rudman, Disruptions in Women’s SelfPromotion: The Backlash Avoidance Model, 34 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 186, 186
(2010).
47. Id.
48. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Researchers: How Women Can Succeed in the Workplace,
INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/
researchers-how-women-can-succeed-workplace; see also Bonnie Marcus, Self Promotion Is a Leadership Skill, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bonniemarcus/2015/03/02/self-promotion-is-a-leadership-skill/#4dd994234e77.
49. Fortunately, the potential for backlash is occasionally addressed in the popular press.
See, e.g., Joan Williams, Women’s Career Advice: Self-Promote Without the Backlash,
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Research has also shown that, in general, women often face obsta50
cles in developing credibility in the workplace. For example, women
often need to bring a unique skill to the table to establish credibility.
One study found that women contribute unique skills to the board, and
that this is the main mechanism through which female board members
51
add value in contrast to new male board members. Other studies have
found that female board members cultivate specialties like corporate social responsibility in order to bolster their credibility: “women independent directors can establish or improve their reputational standing
within the organization through their expertise” in specialized areas like
52
social responsibility, marketing, or human resources. Women seeking
corporate leadership positions thus face an additional challenge when
seeking nomination.
It should also be noted that some studies examining the effects of
53
gender diversity on financial outcomes have led to ambiguous results,
and some private initiatives to increase leadership diversity have been
unsuccessful. According to one report, diversity proposals put forth by
shareholders at major firms in 2016 only saw, on average, 25 percent
54
support. Moreover, in one prominent example, Apple’s board called
the demands of one such proposal “unduly burdensome and not neces55
sary.” Thus, the gender disparities noted earlier arise from a variety of
factors.

50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2011, 6:00 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
womens-career-advice_b_1029059.
A. Carol Rusaw, Achieving Credibility: An Analysis of Women’s Experience, 16 REV. OF
PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 19, 30 (1996).
See Daehyun Kim & Laura T. Starks, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Women Contribute Unique Skills?, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 269 (2016).
Enjung Hyun et al., Women on Boards and Corporate Social Responsibility, 8
SUSTAINABILITY 300 (2016).
Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E. Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709,
722 (2014).
Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, People of
Color, BLOOMBERG News (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-03-02/shareholders-target-pale-male-and-stale-corporate-boards.
Sara Ashley O’Brien, Apple’s Board Calls Diversity Proposal ‘Unduly Burdensome and
Not Necessary,’ CNN (Jan. 15, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/15/
technology/apple-diversity/index.html.

290

michigan journal of gender

&

law

[Vol. 26:279

4. The Case for Gender Parity
Much of the discourse surrounding women in American corporate
56
leadership centers around the “business case for [gender] diversity,” ra57
ther than the moral or constitutional cases. That is, rather than considering the issue from the perspective of equality and fairness, this research
has focused on whether gender equality contributes to success on financial metrics. To this end, a broad literature examines the alleged link be58
tween corporate financial performance and board gender diversity, as
59
well as the impact of diversity on corporate social responsibility, com60
pliance with ethical and social standards, and environmental report61
ing. This argument is also heavily used by American advocacy groups.
For example, the “20% by 2020” campaign cites “better decision making,” “competitive advantage,” and the “huge, untapped pool of [female] talent” to support greater female representation on corporate
62
boards. The Kellogg School of Management has called board gender
63
diversity “a business imperative.” Even the Federal Glass Ceiling
Commission, which reported on the issue in 1995, cast its argument in
terms of the potential for business success, entitling its report “Good for
64
Business: Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital.” As one
researcher notes, “it is usually said that firms will appoint more women
to their boards only if doing so results in economic benefits to the firm

56. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate
Boards, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 449, 464 (2012).
57. See e.g., Marek Szydlo, Constitutional Values Underlying Gender Equality on the Boards
of Companies: How Should the EU Put These Values Into Practice?, 63 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 167,180 (2014).
58. See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm
Financial Performance, 1 SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 1, 40 (2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972763.
59. Hyun et al., supra note 52.
60. Helena Isidro & Márcia Sobral, The Effects of Women on Corporate Boards on Firm
Value, Financial Performance, and Ethical and Social Compliance, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS
1, 19 (2014).
61. Michelle Siew Huie Phua & Poh-Ling Ho, Female Directors on Corporate Boards:
Does Female Leadership Drive Corporate Environmental Transparency?, 34 SHS WEB
OF CONFERENCES 1 (2017).
62. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1.
63. Victoria Medvec, What Will It Take to Get More Women on Boards?, KELLOGG
INSIGHT (Jul. 6, 2018), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/what-will-ittake-to-get-more-women-on-boards.
64. GLASS CEILING COMM’N, supra note 31.
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[…] for that reason, the bulk of academic research investigates the eco65
nomic outcomes for firms that have female directors on their boards.”
B. The European Union
Gender equality is one of the founding values of the European Union, with the principle of equal pay being included in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in 1957 (known as the
66
Treaty of Rome). Gender equality has been promoted ever since, yet
67
progress is slow. The latest policy plan of the E.U., the “Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016 – 2019,” aims at advancing gender
balance in decision-making, closing the gender pay gap, promoting
equal economic independence for women and men, ending gender
based violence, and even contains measures promoting gender equality
68
beyond the E.U.
1. Women on Corporate Boards
The corporate world demonstrates that the glass ceiling is still in
place, as many large companies in Europe include a low number of
women in positions of leadership, although quotas in some countries
69
have improved the numbers on some corporate boards. According to

65. Isidro & Sobral, supra note 6o, at 4.
66. Sophie Jacquot, European Union Gender Equality Policies Since 1957, ENCYCLOPÉDIE
POUR UNE HISTOIRE NOUVELLE DE L’EUROPE (Oct. 30, 2017), https://ehne.fr/en/
article/gender-and-europe/gender-citizenship-europe/european-union-genderequality-policies-1957.
67. Rachael Kennedy, International Women’s Day: EU Progress on Gender Equality is Moving at a ‘Snail’s Pace,’ EURONEWS (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/
2019/03/08/eu-progress-on-gender-equality-is-moving-at-a-snail-s-pace-accordingto-officals.
68. EUR. COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT FOR GENDER EQUALITY 2016-2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/strategic_engagement_
for_gender_equality_en.pdf.
69. Many countries throughout Europe have a dual board structure, with a management
board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board is most analogous to the board
structure in countries like the U.S. and Japan, utilizing a unitary board. EUROPEAN
COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE, WOMEN ON BOARDS: COMMISSION PROPOSES
40% OBJECTIVE (Nov. 14, 2012), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_
en.htm. For more information and a summary of dual board laws in various European nations, see Roger Baker, Board Structures in Europe, EUR. CONFEDERATION OF
DIR. ASS’N, http://ecoda.org/fileadmin/library_private/14_IFC/1_Roger_Barker_Board_structures_in_Europe.docx.
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the 2019 Report on Equality between Women and Men in the E.U.,
women held 29.3 percent of supervisory board positions (non-executive
positions) of large companies in the E.U.-28, but only 16.6 percent of
70
executive positions. Some European countries have tried to improve
women’s presence on boards with the help of gender quotas. For instance, Norway was the first country to legislate board quotas (in 2004)
and many countries followed with laws setting required or optional quo71
tas for women on supervisory boards. The legislative quotas seem to
bring positive results, as nine E.U. countries have already registered at
least 25 percent women on the boards of their largest companies in Oc72
tober 2017, while France was the only E.U. country in which there
were at least 40 percent of each gender at the board level (as of October
73
2017).
2. Women in Management
Although the supervisory board plays an important role in a company, as it controls the activities of the management board, the management (i.e., executive) board still holds a significant role. According to
the 2019 Report on Equality Between Women and Men in the EU,
74
“critical positions within boards are still rarely filled by women.” In the
75
E.U., fewer than one in ten companies has a female chair or CEO.
Moreover, at the E.U. level, women held 16.6 percent of executive positions, which is regarded by the European Commission as marginal pro76
gress.

70. EUR. COMM’N., 2019 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN IN
THE EU 30 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_
cooperation_fundamental_rights/annual_report_ge_2019_en.pdf.
71. Alina Dizik, Do Quotas for Corporate Boards Help Women Advance?, CHICAGO
BOOTH REV., June 15, 2015, https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring2015/do-quotas-for-corporate-boards-help-women-advance. Norway is not a member
state of the European Union.
72. EUR. COMM’N., 2018 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN THE
EU, at 31 (2018), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
950dce57-6222-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1.
73. Id.
74. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 70, at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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3. Explanations for Disparities
The reasons in the E.U. for gender disparities in top management
and on boards are similar to the reasons in the U.S. and thus are not
repeated here. In Europe, however, there are also institutional factors
driving the movement to increase female representation on supervisory
boards, such as welfare provisions (e.g. child care provisions, maternity
leave provisions, policies to assist with the work-life balance), political
77
coalitions, and a legacy of initiatives. Left-leaning governments are
currently more likely to require more female representation on
supervisory boards. For example, a survey of 201 Norwegian firms
found a correlation between women on boards and an increase in board
78
development activities as well as a decreased level of conflict. Though
as presented above, the findings regarding the relationship between gender equality on boards and firm performance are sometimes ambiguous
or contradictory, gender equality is still a priority for the E.U.: as stated
in 2019 by VČra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and
Gender Equality, “[t]he EU cannot fail on enforcing this important
right to equality and on making use of the huge potential lying in half
79
of its population.” Therefore, though the progress is slow and though
the financial effects of an increased female presence on corporate boards
in the E.U. still need to be further researched, the E.U. remains committed to its gender equality policy.
4. The Case for Gender Parity
As in the U.S., scholarship in the E.U. has focused on whether
there is a significant link between firm performance and the number of
women in positions of top leadership. One study found that in
Denmark, having a higher percentage of women on supervisory boards
80
could result in better performance. Another study regarding women in
European-listed companies suggests positive effects of diverse boards on
77. Siri Terjesen et al., Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors, 128 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 233, 246 (2015).
78. Sabina Nielsen & Morten Huse, The Contribution of Women on Boards of Directors:
Going Beyond the Surface, 18 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 136, 145 (2010).
79. EUR. COMM’N., 2019 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN THE
EU, 4 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_
cooperation_fundamental_rights/annual_report_ge_2019_en.pdf.
80. See Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, Women on Boards and Firm Performance, 17 J. OF
MGMT. & GOV. 491 (2011), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2
Fs10997-011-9186-1.pdf.
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81

corporate governance and even on firm performance. A futher study
found that companies with a higher proportion of women in top
82
management perform better.
Some studies suggest a positive relationship between the number of
female supervisory board members and the number of female officers in
83
management. Small improvements can be seen with a legally mandated
84
quota for women on supervisory boards. Scholars have analyzed the
impact of gender on small business performance in the United Kingdom
and concluded that there are “some considerable differences by sex in
85
quantitative economic and financial performance measures.”
Another study shows that in 3,876 public companies, the presence
of independent female directors is necessary on supervisory boards to
86
optimize firms’ performance. This means that, when no women are
included as supervisory board members, the companies’ results were
worse (measured by Tobin’s Q and shown by the Return on Assets).
Another study of 151 of the capital market-listed German firms shows
that only after a critical mass of about 30 percent of women in absolute
87
positions is attained, can higher firm performance be reached.
88
Other studies, however, did not replicate these findings. For
example, one study points to a lack of evidence that female
89
representation in supervisory boards improves profitability. In a study
81. Achim Buchwald & Hanna Hottenrott, Women on the Board and Executive Duration
– Evidence for European Listed Firms, DÜSSELDORF INST. FOR COMPETITION ECON.,
at 19 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1650.pdf.
82. See Georges Desvaux et al., Women Matter: Gender Diversity, a Corporate Performance
Driver, 1 MCKINSEY & CO. 23 (2007), http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/
other/women-matter-oct-2007.
83. See Diana Bilimoria, The Relationship Between Women Corporate Directors and Women
Corporate Officers, 18 J. OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES, 47, 53 (2006); Siri Terjesen et al.,
Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORP. GOV.:
AN INT’L REV. 320, 324 (2009).
84. James Corkery & Madeline Taylor, The Gender Gap: A Quota for Women on the
Board, BOND UNIV. CORP. GOVERNANCE J. (2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
fe63/02c541de832c14ca340da32497a08677d420.pdf (accessed 12 Sept. 2019).
85. Peter Rosa et al., Gender as a Determinant of Small Business Performance: Insights from
a British Study, 8 SMALL BUS. ECON. 463, 474 (1996).
86. Siri Terjesen et al., Does the Presence of Independent and Female Directors Impact Firm
Performance? A Multi-Country Study of Board Diversity, 20 J. OF MGMT &
GOVERNANCE 447 (2015).
87. Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What
Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?,” 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61, 68 (2013).
88. Caspar Rose, Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish Evidence, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 404, 411 (2007).
.
89 Daniel Ferreira, Board Diversity: Should We Trust Research to Inform Policy?, 23 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 108, 110 (2015).
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of 108 large German corporations between 2009 and 2013, there was
not enough evidence to indicate a significant relationship between
90
gender diversity and firms’ financial performance. The authors of the
study believe the results could differ if a larger sample is analyzed or if
small companies rather than large companies are considered.
Many actors have urged companies to more effectively use
women’s talent: for example, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, an international economic coalition to
stimulate economic progress, emphasized that women “can provide
society with different perspectives and approaches to management,
91
organisation and business issues.” The International Labour Organization reported in 2015 that “more concerted efforts and advocacy are
needed to share information on the benefits of utilizing women’s talent
92
and skills at all levels, including in the boardroom.” The European Institute for Gender Equality argues in favor of gender equality by indicating its benefits: “a more gender equal EU would have strong, positive
GDP impacts growing over time, a higher level of employment and
could respond to challenges related to the ageing population in the
93
EU.” Whether these arguments will lead to achieving gender equality
at the E.U. level and beyond is still uncertain, yet important steps toward this goal have been made and the measures implemented, such as
gender quotas, show results.
C. Japan
Japanese women have long been underrepresented in positions of
power. In 2016, the female participation rate in administrative and
managerial positions was only 13 percent compared to 43.4 percent in

90. Artur Dick, Female Directors on German Supervisory Boards and Firms’ Financial Performance at 7 (July 2, 2015) (unpublished Bachelor Thesis, University of Twente)
https://essay.utwente.nl/67308/1/DICK_BA_IBA.pdf.
91. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD REPORT TO G7 LEADERS ON
WOMEN AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A SUMMARY OF RECENT DATA AND POLICY
DEVELOPMENTS IN G7 COUNTRIES, at 2 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/gender/
OECD-Report%20-to-G7-Leaders-on-Women-and-Entrepreneurship.pdf.
92. Women in Business and Management. Gaining Momentum, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO) 4 (2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/—-dgreports/—-dcomm/—-publ/documents/publication/wcms_334882.pdf.
93. Economic Case for Gender Equality in the EU, EUROPEAN INST. FOR GENDER
EQUALITY
(2017),
https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/policy-areas/
economic-and-financial-affairs/economic-benefits-gender-equality/economic-case.
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the United States and 39.2 percent in Sweden. At listed companies,
women occupied only 3.4 percent of the executive positions, compared
96
to 30 percent in France and 17 percent in the United States.
1. Women on Corporate Boards
A Morgan Stanley Capital International progress report regarding
women on boards found that most companies based in Asian countries
such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China continue
97
to have all male boards. However, the report showed that in recent
years there has been a decline in the proportion of companies with all
male boards, from 56.1 percent in 2016 to 45 percent in 2018. Despite
this positive trend, Japanese corporate boards continue to be male dom98
inated.
2. Women in Management
As Figure 1 shows, in 2018, there was a considerable gap between
the proportion of working women and that of women in managerial positions in many developed countries.

94. Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in Various Fields, at 4
(2018), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamphlet/womenand-men18/pdf/1-2.pdf.
95. “Firm whose shares are listed (quoted) on a stock exchange for public trading. Also
called quoted company,” Listed Company, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/listed-company.html.
96. Nobuko Kobayashi, Let’s Get Real About Female Equality in Corporate Japan -The
Government Must Push Companies to Set Aside Stereotypes and Promote Women,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV., Jan. 22, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Let-s-get-realabout-female-equality-in-corporate-Japan2 (accessed Sept. 3, 2018).
97. Morgan Ellis & Meggin Thwing Eastman, Women on Boards - Progress Report 2018,
MORGAN STANLEY CAP. INT’L 3 (Dec. 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/
10199/36ef83ab-ed68-c1c1-58fe-86a3eab673b8 (accessed Jul. 21, 2019).
98. Id. at 13.
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Figure 1: Proportion of women workers and women in administrative and
managerial positions in 2018 (Source: Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet
99
Office).

A 2018 document issued by the Japanese Gender Equality Bureau
Cabinet Office reveals that, despite Japan ranking 17 of 188 countries
on the Human Development Index scale measuring access to healthcare
100
and education, the Gender Gap Index ranks Japan a dismal 114 of
101
144 countries on female economic participation and opportunity. The
2017 Global Gender Gap Report shows that, although Japan is making
progress in closing the gender gap in terms of equal access to health care
and education, it lags behind many developed countries in terms of female participation in the workforce, in particular in leadership and
102
lawmaking positions.

99. GENDER EQUITY CABINET OFFICE, Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in
Various Fields, at 5 (2019), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamph
let/women-and-men19/pdf/1-2.pdf.
100. Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in Various Fields, supra note 94.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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3. Explanations for Disparities
Gender roles in family and society differ across cultures. Researchers note that perceptions of female leadership are different in Asia be103
cause of different traditions and religious beliefs. For example, in
some Asian countries with a strong Confucian tradition such as Japan
and Korea, despite women’s increased participation in the workforce
and improved social status, the idea of women in leadership positions is
104
quite challenging. In Japanese culture, the ideology of “good wife,
wise mother,” or ryôsai kenbo, regarding women as caregivers and nurturers, has influenced generations, and has contributed to a clear deline105
ation of the working spheres of men and women. Women are expected to be nurturing, supportive, intuitive and communicative, and
106
not to engage in typically-male activities such as pursuing a career.
Unlike in the United States, where many women work to further their
107
108
career, Japanese women work to support their family. The idea that
women must prioritize their roles of wife and mother has pervaded social, economic, fiscal, and corporate policies, which ascribe distinct
realms to men and women and regard them not as equals, but as com109
plementary agents. To this day, these cultural pressures tend to affect
modern women's career orientations and their aspirations regarding ac110
ceding to leadership positions.
On the other hand, their lack of power in the public sphere is
compensated by almost absolute power in the household. One feminist
author has found that although traditional roles of women have been
changing, women are still facing internal and external pressures to as103. Yonjoo Cho et al., Asian Women in Top Management: Eight Country Cases, 18 HUM.
RESOURCE DEV. INT’L 407 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13678868.2015.
1020717.
104. Young Lan Kim, The Change of Women’s Social Status in Korea: Progress and Reaction,
27 ASIAN WOMEN 1 (Mar. 2011), http://e-asianwomen.org/xml/00938.pdf.
105. Usui et al., Women, Institutions, and Leadership in Japan, 27 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 3,
86, (2003).
106. See id.
107. Margaret A. Shaffer, Janice R. W. Joplin & Yu-Shan Hsu, Expanding the Boundaries
of Work–Family Research: A Review and Agenda for Future Research, 11 INT’L J. OF
CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 221, 408 (2011).
108. Eun-Suk Lee, Jae Yoon Chang & Hyosun Kim, The Work–Family Interface in Korea:
Can Family Life Enrich Work Life?, 22 INT’L J. OF HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 20
(2011), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09585192.2011.573976;
Masako Ishii-Kuntz, Japanese Fathers: Work Demands and Family Roles, in MEN,
WORK, AND FAMILY 45 – 67 (Jane C. Hood ed., 1993).
109. Usui et al., supra note 105, at 88.
110. Id.
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111

sume their traditional roles. There is also considerable resistance to
women becoming involved in spheres in which men have almost abso112
lute hegemony.
The increasing access to higher education of Japanese women,
combined with the country's need to align its gender policy with those
of other developed countries, has necessitated redefining the status of
113
women in Japanese society. In recent years, the number of Japanese
women in higher education has been higher than ever before. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the percentage of women attending four-year
114
universities increased from 15 percent to 44 percent. Another important trend is that the number of companies that hire women in career-track jobs has been increasing. The percentage of such companies
115
grew from 11 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2008.
The downside is that career-track employment and leadership positions remain a male-dominated field in Japan. Professor Linda Lindsey's
phrase “men have careers; women have jobs” has never rung more
116
true. Gendered beliefs and practices are responsible for keeping wom117
en away from leadership positions. Professor Kumiko Nemoto talks
about the "vertical segregation" of women in the workplace as the main
cause for excluding women from management jobs and points out that,
despite a change in female working patterns in the past years, the num118
ber of female managers has yet to rise. Among factors that bar women
from attaining top positions, she identifies prioritizing lifelong employ119
ment of male workers, harassment (including maternity harassment),
111. Ayako Kano, Backlash, Fight Back, and Back-Pedaling: Responses to State Feminism in
Contemporary Japan, 1 INT’L J. ASIAN STUDIES 8, at 53 (2011).
112. Id. at 53.
113. Elise K. Tipton, Being Women in Japan, 1970-2000, in WOMEN IN ASIA 225 (Louise
Edwards & Mina Roces, eds., 2000).
114. Mari Osawa, Gender-Equality and the Revitalization of Japan’s Society and Economy
Under Globalization, https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/other/jrft3q
00000014pn-att/JICA-RI_Japan_1_Osawa.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
115. Kumiko Nemoto, When Culture Resists Progress: Masculine Organizational Culture
and Its Impacts on the Vertical Segregation of Women in Japanese Companies, 27 WORK,
EMP. & SOC’Y 153, 154 (2013).
116. LINDA L. LINDSEY, GENDER ROLES. A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2005).
117. See Nemoto, supra note 115, at 155 – 58.
118. Id.
119. According to Matahara Net, a Japanese organization founded by former victim of
maternity harassment Sayaka Osakabe, the term “maternity harassment” (abbreviated
“matahara” in Japanese), “refers to the unfair treatment of women, namely harassment, both physical and mental, instilled upon working women when they become
pregnant or give birth, which may involve termination of their employment, termination of their contract of employment, or forcing them to voluntarily leave their employment. Along with power harassment and sexual harassment, matahara is one of
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the government's support of the male-breadwinner model over the dualincome family model through taxation policy, discriminatory views of
female managers, and the absence of role models of women with author120
ity.
Women entering career-track jobs are expected to work hard to
compete with their male co-workers. This means long hours, after-work
drinking parties, and having to cope with the feeling of not belonging in
121
an exclusively male environment. In the Japanese organizational culture there is a clash between organizational masculinity and women in
122
positions of power. Professor Nemoto refers to this phenomenon as
“the organizational processes whereby gendered beliefs and customs
123
shape workers’ construction of identity in the workplace.” In maledominated organizations, men tend to assert their superiority by displaying demeaning, disrespectful, or exclusionary attitudes regarding the
124
qualities and capacities of women. In order to climb the corporate
ladder, and in the absence of female role models, Japanese career women
tend either to emulate male patterns of behavior, such as competitive125
ness or ruthlessness, or to ingratiate themselves to their superiors.
While in androcentric organizational cultures like Japan, “bossy” behavior is generally seen as the norm in a male leader, similar behavior in a
woman is considered a “marker of deviant femininity” and sanctioned as
126
such. Women are expected to be modest and submissive, qualities that
127
are perceived as “feminine.” Career women who sacrifice their “femininity” tend to be regarded as unlikable by male coworkers or subordi128
nates, and aggressive or harsh by female subordinates. They are often
perceived by male coworkers as incompetent, unprofessional, or too

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.

128.

the three major forms of harassment that burden Japanese women in the workforce.”
MATAHARA NET, http://www.mataharanet.org/en/what-is-matahara/ (last visited
June 20, 2019).
Nemoto, supra note 115, at 154 – 56.
SARAH RUTHERFORD, WOMEN’S WORK, MEN’S CULTURES: OVERCOMING
RESISTANCE AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES 15 – 16 (2011).
Nemoto, supra note 115, at 156 – 57.
Id. at 156 (citing Robin Ely & Irene Padavic, A Feminist Analysis of Organizational
Research on Sex Differences, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1121 (2007)).
See generally Patricia Yancey Martin, ‘Mobilizing Masculinities’: Women’s Experiences
of Men at Work, 8(4) ORG. ARTICLES 587 (2001) (discussing how men assert their
masculinity at work through analyzing the experiences of six women at work).
Nemoto, supra note 115, at 157 – 58.
Id. at 163.
See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES,
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 297 (2d ed.
2001).
See Nemoto, supra note 115, at 157–58, 163.
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emotional, even hysterical. It seems that Japanese career women can
do little to earn the respect of their male co-workers, and must strive
harder than their European and Western peers. They have to walk the
line between being feminine (and risking appearing weak, immoral or
incompetent), and being masculine (and being considered bossy and
harsh).
4. The Case for Gender Parity
Women's potential to boost economic development has been debated in Japan since the 1990s. In 2012, the International Monetary
Fund’s managing director Christine Lagarde said, “Women can save Japan . . . Today you have five out of ten Japanese women out of the job
130
market, as opposed to two out of ten men.” In a report issued in
2012, the IMF predicted that an increase in female workforce participation from 63 percent in 2010 to 70 percent by 2030 would add four
131
percent to the GDP. Researcher Kathy Matsui compares the maleheavy Japanese workforce to an athlete “running a marathon with one
132
leg.” She estimates that having more women in the workforce and in
leadership positions would help boost the country’s GDP by as much as
133
12.5 percent. In a so-called “blue sky scenario,” Matsui predicts that,
should the large proportion of women currently involved in part-time
employment work longer hours or be hired in full-time jobs, the GDP
134
increase could be as high as 15 percent. Moreover, at the microeconomic level, a study based on the data on female managers disclosed
by 297 firms between June 2018 and April 2019 showed that the firms
with the highest numbers of female managers (above 15 percent) had
129. Id. at 163.
130. WILLIAM PESEK, JAPANIZATION: WHAT THE WORLD CAN LEARN FROM JAPAN’S LOST
DECADES 40 (2014).
131. Emma Dalton, Womenomics, ‘Equality’ and Abe’s Neo-liberal Strategy to Make Japanese
Women Shine, 20 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 96 (2017) (citing Chad Stienbert & Masato
Nakane, Can Women Save Japan? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/12/248)).
132. PESEK, supra note 130, at 41.
133. Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk, GOLDMAN SACHS
JAPAN: PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, 1, 5 (May 30, 2014), https://www.goldmansachs.com/
insights/pages/macroeconomic-insights-folder/womenomics4-folder/womenomics4time-to-walk-the-talk.pdf.
134. Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 5.0: 20 Years On Progress, Areas for Improvement,
Potential 15% GDP Boost, GOLDMAN SACHS JAPAN: PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, 1,10
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/womenomics5.0/multimedia/womenomics-5.0-report.pdf.
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the highest 5-year average sales growths (over six percent), as well as the
135
highest return on equity compared to those with fewer female leaders.
II. Legal Backdrop: Gender Discrimination and Quotas
In this Section, we analyze the legal environments in the U.S., several countries in the E.U., and Japan surrounding gender discrimination
and efforts to eradicate it. The imposition of gender quotas has been legally mandated with some success in some E.U. countries, but such a
strategy would face significant legal hurdles in the United States. In Japan, government-sanctioned targets have yielded rather disappointing
results.
A. The United States
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
136
in employment based on certain protected characteristics. These protected characteristics include an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or
137
national origin.” Congress conceived of the Act as a way to help minorities attain a level playing field in society, and Title VII of the Act
138
was designed to do that in employment. Protection for women was
not originally part of the bill because their issue—unequal pay for equal
work—was considered solved by the Equal Pay Act, passed the prior
139
year. Sex was added to the bill as a protected characteristic at the last
140
minute, however, as a way to derail the legislation. It passed despite
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 50).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw).
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (“The intent to drive
employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national
origin is the theme of a good deal of [Title VII]’s legislative history.”).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 50).
140. Cynthia Deitch, Gender, Race and Class Politics and the Inclusion of Women in Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 7 GENDER & SOC’Y 183, 186 (1993) (“The gender
discrimination proposal conveniently fit all three prongs of the southern strategy. It
was potentially divisive, it could easily have sidetracked the debate, and it promised to
complicate matters for the enforcement agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, or EEOC) created by Title VII. When the civil rights bill passed the
House, two days after the debate over the gender amendment, all but one of the men
who had voted for the amendment voted against the whole bill.”); Jo Freeman, The
Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement, 78 AM. J. OF SOC., 792, 798 (1973)
(discussing how opponents of the bill aimed to defeat it by adding an objectionable
term so as to divide the coalition that supported the legislation); Mary E. Guy &
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the addition, and protection against discrimination on the basis of sex
(subsequently interpreted as gender) was added to the groups protected
141
from discrimination. Because of the lack of legislative history and
agreement on what it meant, protection for women under Title VII has
142
usually lagged behind that of other groups. Thus, advances in protection for minorities are often cited when women initially seek those same
143
rights.
Through subsequent case law, sexual harassment was also recog144
nized as discrimination based on sex under Title VII. The Act allows
courts to mandate “appropriate affirmative action” as a remedy in cases
145
of intentional unlawful discrimination. Additionally, in the 1989 case
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that the female
plaintiff could bring suit against Price Waterhouse under a “mixed motive” gender discrimination theory, where discriminatory reasons were a
146
“motivating” factor to a plaintiff’s adverse employment decision. This
motivating factor language was then included in the Civil Rights Act of
147
1991.

141.
142.

143.

144.
145.
146.

147.

Vanessa M. Fenley, Inch by Inch: Gender Equity Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34
REV. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., 1, 44 (2013).
Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251, 430 (2015).
See Deitch, supra note 140, at 189, 199 (“[W]hen the state makes policy that supposedly benefits women or expands women’s rights, it does so within a framework that
also reinforces women’s subordination. . . [T]he EEOC initially attempted to ignore
women in the implementation process.”) (citing CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 226-27 (1989)); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories
about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 177071 (1990).
See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 185 (2005); ALICE S. ROSSI,
FEMINISTS IN POLITICS: A PANEL ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN’S
CONFERENCE 16 (1982) (“The primary goals of NOW (National Organization for
Women) in its founding year were closely modeled after those of civil rights organizations and of the Kennedy Commission itself; that is, to expand women’s economic
rights and opportunities. NOW was to be a kind of NAACP for women.”).
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 53).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250, 258 (1989). However, the defendant could escape liability by showing that “it would have made the same decision
even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Westlaw). Unlike in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, if the
defendant can show it would have made the same employment decision, the defendant is still liable; however, plaintiff’s relief is limited. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Westlaw).
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Modern affirmative action is a product of the 1960s, when there
was a push to correct social disparities and to give equal access to the re148
sources that could help every American achieve a good life in society.
These resources included decent housing, education, and employ149
ment. In the educational context, the Supreme Court did away with a
150
long-standing precedent that held segregated schools were legal. This,
151
in turn, led to integration in public schools. It took the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, to address other areas such as private
152
employment.
Quotas are a form of affirmative action that mandate numbers such
as the percentage of women or minorities that must be in certain positions. Quotas aim to address the under-representation of minority
153
groups, and speed up attainment of equality by mandating specific
minimum numbers for representation. Quotas have been used in Euro154
pean countries with regard to equality for women on boards. Quotas,
however, face legal hurdles in the United States, as will be explained be155
low. Instead, affirmative action has been used in the United States.
Affirmative action uses goals, the attainment of which is not required,
156
for the same purpose. It is an inferior method that is explained by the
history of the drive for equality by the legislatures and courts in the last
50-plus years.
In the late 1970s, companies, universities, and governmental institutions began to give preferences on the basis of race to groups that tra157
ditionally suffered discrimination. Governmental racial preferences
were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-

148. See Hugh Davis Graham, The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the Regulatory State, 523 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 50 (1992).
149. See, e.g., JAMES W. BUTTON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: IMPACT OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES (1989).
150. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
151. In this context, the Constitution protects citizens against discrimination by government action. It does not address actions by private actors such as schools.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Westlaw).
153. Thekla Morgenroth & Michelle K. Ryan, Quotas and Affirmative Action: Understanding Group-Based Outcomes and Attitudes, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS,
2 https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/spc3.12374.
154. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of the use of quotas for women on boards in
some European countries.
155. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
156. See R.G., What is Affirmative Action?, THE ECONOMIST (June 15, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/15/what-is-affirmative-action.
157. Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 83, 88 (2013).
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158

tion. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme
159
Court laid the groundwork for allowing racial preferences. Justice
Powell, who cast the deciding vote, cited one of the school’s justifications for the preference—the educational benefits that flow from an
ethnically diverse student body—to be a constitutionally permissible
160
goal. At the same time, explicit racial quotas were found unconstitutional because they completely excluded non-preferred groups from ad161
mission seats. Subsequent decisions laid out the parameters of affirma162
tive action and goals, as these preferences are known, and courts
163
extended the concepts to workers in the private sector. Justice Powell’s
ban on quotas in Bakke still stands, however.
164
Almost a decade later, affirmative action was extended to women.
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court held that an affirmative
action plan that considered being female to be a “plus factor” in the hiring process was valid when there was a “manifest imbalance” in terms of
165
women’s representation. The Court noted that no men were automatically excluded from the program and no positions were set aside for
166
women, i.e., that there were no quotas. According to the Court, in
order for an affirmative action program to be valid, there must be: 1)
evidence of a manifest imbalance or past discrimination; 2) an existing
plan under which the woman was favored; 3) a temporary plan (lasting
only until the imbalance was corrected); 4) only qualified people selected; 5) no unnecessary trammeling of the interests of the majority; and 6)
167
goals, not quotas.
Subsequent court decisions have shown that the legitimacy of an
168
affirmative action plan turns on the level of scrutiny to be applied. A
divergence developed between public sector affirmative action plans and
those voluntarily adopted by private sector organizations. Public sector
158. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. The Court was split 4-1-4. Justice Powell, in casting the
deciding vote, found that the University’s program could not be sustained. Id.
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
161. The Court cited Harvard’s program as an example of a successful, race-conscious
program that does not use quotas. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 – 20.
162. When Title VII was enacted, affirmative action in private employment was mentioned only as a remedy to intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e5(g)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 56).
163. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
164. Jonathan S. Leonard, Women and Affirmative Action, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., 61, 62
(1989).
165. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 – 34 (1987).
166. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
167. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640 – 41.
168. See Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730, 735 (Nev. 1997).
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plans have been subjected to much closer scrutiny because they involve
discrimination by the government, necessarily implicating the Constitu169
tion’s demand for equal treatment. In general, the courts have become
much more restrictive regarding what is sufficient to justify affirmative
action in the public sector, while the private sector has been relatively
unaffected because the same constitutional constraints are not applica170
ble. Thus, private sector affirmative action plans are examined under
the Title VII rules discussed in Johnson.
Voluntarily-adopted plans in the private sector, if they follow the
restrictions listed above, can also be sustained. Having a preference for a
woman outside of an established affirmative action program, though,
171
can subject the employer to suits for “reverse discrimination.” Begin172
ning with the 1989 case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, which involved set-asides in public works projects, and continued in Adarand
173
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court has demanded a strict
scrutiny analysis for affirmative action in the public sector, which requires a compelling governmental interest to justify the affirmative
treatment and that the plan be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter174
est.
The use of quotas in the United States to rectify racial and gender
imbalances has a long and troubled history. At times, quotas were used
175
to limit or prevent certain groups from emigrating to the U.S. Quotas
have also been used in other sectors such as employment and education
176
for the same purpose. For example, many of the most prestigious universities, such as Princeton, Yale, and Harvard, had quotas on the number of Jewish people whom they would admit in the first half of the

169. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490–92 (1989).
170. Dworkin et al., supra note 157, at 91–92.
171. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380, 381 (8th Cir.
1975) (suit by men who earned less than women after minimum wages for women
were set to redress wage imbalance); Rudebusch v. Arizona, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1058,
1064-67 (D. Ariz. 2006) (regarding a raise in women’s pay for equity purposes without adjusting men’s pay). The plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case usually has the
additional proof requirement of showing that the employer is one of those unusual
employers who discriminates against the majority.
172. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 477–78.
173. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
174. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 477–78; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
175. Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST., 67, 67 (1999).
176. MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970 (Greenwood Press
1979).
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177

twentieth century. Stanford University limited the number of women
admitted in order to avoid the “feminization” of the University, a limi178
tation that persisted into the 1960s. Jane Stanford, who endowed the
University, felt that having too many women was not consistent with
honoring her deceased son, in whose memory the University was found179
ed. Thus, quotas in the United States have been used to control a
group that, at the time, was considered undesirable in some way. Today,
Harvard University is being sued for allegedly setting quotas on Asian180
Americans in a variation on that theme. Harvard allegedly is using
quotas in the name of diversity or racial balancing, otherwise known as
181
affirmative action. The Harvard suit is seen as an attempt to bring an
affirmative action case before the current Supreme Court, viewed by
some as conservative, in the hope that it will lead the Court to ban af182
firmative action.
B. The European Union
This Section briefly discusses the laws and regulations with regard
to gender diversity in seven E.U. countries. These countries, France,
Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, were the
home countries of the largest and most liquid stocks of the Eurozone in
183
2015. All seven countries are represented by companies included in
the EURO STOXX 50 index, and each of the countries has regulations

177. Shira Telushkin, The Vanishing Ivy League Jew, TABLET (Oct. 15, 2018, 9:30 PM),
https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/272350/the-vanishing-ivyleague-jew; see also, Ben Sales, Harvard Once Capped the Number of Jews. Is It Doing
the Same Thing to Asian Americans Now?, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Oct. 17,
2018, 12:47PM), https://www.jta.org/2018/10/17/united-states/harvard-oncecapped-the-number-of-jews-is-it-doing-the-same-thing-to-asians-now.
178. Sam Scott, Why Jane Stanford Limited Women’s Enrollment to 500, STANFORD MAG.,
Sept. 2018, at 48. She pictured the university as being a rival to Harvard and Oxford,
neither of which admitted women. Id. at 50.
179. The total number was eventually set at 500. Susan B. Anthony was appalled that a
woman would do this to other women. Id.
180. See, e.g., Melissa Korn & Nicole Hong, Harvard Faces Probe over Admissions Policy,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2017, at A1.
181. Anemona Hartocollis, Harvard Rated Asian-American Applicants Lower on Personality
Traits, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2018, at A1. The class of 2021 is 22.2 percent
Asian-American. Id.
182. See id.
183. EURO STOXX 50, STOXX, https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SX5E
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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184

regarding the inclusion of women on corporate boards. Excepting
Finland, where board gender diversity is regulated in the country’s
corporate governance code, all other countries have integrated these
185
regulations into national laws. In France, Spain, and the Netherlands,
the regulations apply to companies surpassing certain thresholds
186
regarding their number of employees or their turnover. In Germany,
the law applies to listed companies that are fully obliged to employee codetermination, or the right of the employees to participate in the deci187
sion-making process of a company.
Five of the seven countries have a target quota for women on cor188
porate boards. France and Italy instituted a two-step approach. In
these countries, one quota was required to be reached by the companies
189
within a given period of time with a stricter quota required thereafter.
The laws on quota requirements for women on boards tend to focus on
190
the supervisory board. Within the EURO STOXX 50 countries, only
in the Netherlands does the quota for women also apply to management
191
boards. This index has a fixed number of components and is part of
192
the STOXX blue-chip index family. Apart from the rules in Finland,
which are based on company self-regulation, all other quota require193
ments for women are compulsory. Nevertheless, in Spain and the
Netherlands the laws do not include any sanctions for companies failing
194
to achieve the defined female quota. Hence, it is questionable whether
these quotas are, in reality, binding.

184. Women’s Quota, DIW BERLIN, https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.412682.de/presse/
diw_glossar/frauenquote.html (last updated Jan. 2019).
185. Gender Quotas, FINNISH INST. FOR HEALTH & WELLNESS, https://thl.fi/en/web/
gender-equality/gender-equality-in-finland/decision-making/gender-quotas (last updated June 26, 2018); Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
186. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
187. Quote für Mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen: Privatwirtschaft, BUNDESMINISTERIUM
FÜR FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN UND JUGEND (May 5, 2017),
https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/gleichstellung/frauen-und-arbeitswelt/quoteprivatwitschaft/quote-fuer-mehr-frauen-in-fuehrungspositionen—
privatwirtschaft/78562?view=DEFAULT.
188. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183.
193. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
.
194 Id.
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In 2007, Spain implemented the Law for the Effective Equality of
195
Women and Men, or the Equality Law. The law establishes a 40 percent quota for women on corporate boards. Sanctions, however, are not
196
integrated into the law. The Amendment of the Companies Act, effective December 2014, requires companies to define targets for female
representation on the board and to prepare a plan on how to achieve
197
that target.
Belgium, France, and Italy introduced quotas for women on boards
198
in 2011. All three laws are compulsory and sanction companies that
199
are noncompliant. The Belgian law guarantees that women constitute
a minimum percentage of the board of directors; it requires a quota of at
200
least 33 percent women. In France, the regulation was codified as part
of the constitution as an extension of the parity clause to “social and
201
professional responsibilities.” The law targets supervisory boards and
requires 20 percent women on the boards by 2014 and 40 percent by
202
203
2017. The sanction in France is identical to the one in Belgium. In
both countries, board seat appointments violating the law are invalid
204
and must be vacated. The Italian Golfo-Mosca Act requires boards to
205
be comprised of 20 percent women by 2012 and 33 percent by 2015.
However, the regulation is only valid for three consecutive elections of
206
the supervisory board after the implementation of the law. Companies
not reaching the quotas face financial penalties—the minimum fine is

195. Reyes Palá-Laguna & Luisa Esteban-Salvador, Gender Quota for Boards of Corporations in Spain, 17 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2016).
196. Tània Verge & Emanuela Lombardo, The Differential Approach to Gender Quotas in
Spain: Regulated Politics and Self-Regulated Corporate Boards, in EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS 7 (2015).
197. Palá-Laguna & Esteban-Salvador, supra note 195, at 383–84.
198. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
199. Id.
200. Petra Meier, Gender Quotas in Belgium: A Never Ending Story of Gendering Compartmentalized Citizenship? 3 (European University Institute, Working Paper
Law 2015/25, 2015), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35975/LAW_
2015_25.pdf.
201. European Parliament, The Policy on Gender Equality in France 12 (2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/510024/IPOL_IDA(2
015)510024_EN.pdf.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
204. Id.
205. Giulia Ferrari et al., Gender Quotas: Challenging the Boards, Performance, and the Stock
Market, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LABOR (IZA), DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 10239
4 (2016).
206. Id.
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€100,000, while the maximum fine is €1,000,000—and a breakup of
207
the supervisory board.
In 2013, the Netherlands integrated a 30 percent quota for women
208
on boards into the Dutch Civil Code. The quota is compulsory but
without sanctions, and it applies to the supervisory and the management
209
boards of a company. Originally, the quota was only intended to be in
effect until 2016, with the idea that the percentages of women on
210
boards would reach the 30 percent target by then. The target was not
achieved, however. In 2017, the existing law was extended, requiring
211
companies to attain 20 percent female board membership by 2019. If
the 20 percent target is achieved, companies will have until 2023 to
212
achieve 30 percent female board membership. If the 20 percent target
is not then achieved, the government will impose a 30 percent target on
213
the company and combine it with sanctions.
In Germany, the law requires supervisory boards to meet a quota of
214
30 percent women. If companies do not fulfill the quota, any vacant
seats on the supervisory board stay unoccupied until filled with a wom215
an to achieve the quota. Moreover, companies must define targets for
the percentage of women on their supervisory and management boards
216
as well as for their top management-level positions. These targets must
be disclosed and may not be set any lower than the current percentage
217
of women in these positions. The time span to achieve these targets is
218
five years.

207. Women’s Quota, supra note 184.
208. See Sonja A. Kruisinga & Linda Senden, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards in the
Netherlands: Waiting on the World to Change, in 1 GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE USE OF DIFFERENT QUOTA REGULATIONS 177, 177 (Cathrine
Seierstad et al., eds., 2017).
209. See id. at 187.
210. Id. at 177.
211. Id. at 187.
212. Id. at 189.
213. Id.
214. Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an
Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst [FüPoG]
[Law for the Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the
Private and Public Sector], Apr. 24, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL l], at
654, art. 3 (Ger.), http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_
BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl115s0642.pdf.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 654, art. 3.
218. Id.
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Finland has a self-regulated system in which companies set their
219
own goals for the percentage of women on their corporate boards.
The regulation applies to companies that have been listed since 2008. If
only one gender is represented on a corporate board, the company must
220
publicly explain the reason for it.
The above laws and regulations are summarized in the following
table.
Table 1: Laws regarding gender quota in countries having companies in the
EURO STOXX index (Main Source: DIW Berlin, 2018, Women
221
Quota).
Country

Deadline

Boards

Company type

Belgium

Law
Quota
promulgation
2011
30%

Sanctions

2017

Management
board

Listed companies &
Any new appointment
state-owned enterprises is void if the quota is
not met

Finland

-

-

-

-

-

France

2011

20% /
40%

2014/
2017

Supervisory
board

Germany

2015

30%

2016

Italy

2011

Netherlands

2011

20% /
30%
30%

2012/
2015
2016

Spain

2007

40%

2015

-

Listed companies,
Any new appointment
companies with over is void if the quota is
500 employees or more not met
than 50 million Euro
sales
Supervisory
Listed companies and The position remains
board
companies subjected to vacant if the quota is
co-determination
not met
Supervisory
Listed companies &
Financial penalty up to
board
state-owned enterprise one million Euro
Supervisory and Listed companies &
No
management
companies with over
board
250 employees
State-owned enterprises No
Management
board
and corporations &
companies with over
250 employees

We conducted an empirical examination of the companies of the
EURO STOXX index as of 2015 to establish whether these companies
219. See Virginie Issumo et al., Country Tables – Länderberichte, 19 DJBZ ZEITSCHRIFT DES
DEUTSCHEN JURISTINNENBUNDES [DJBZ] 119, 122 (2016).
220. Id.
221. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. Finland does not have gender quota legislation. Section 8 of the Corporate Governance Code set by the Securities Market Association
for listed companies, which applies to all companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, includes a recommendation that both genders be represented on the board,
and requires a public statement if it deviates from the recommendation. This approach has been successful in Finland. See FINNCHAM WOMEN LEADERS PROGRAM,
RECORD NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS IN FINISH LISTED COMPANIES, The Seventh WOMEN DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES REPORT, 11–13 (2017),
https://naisjohtajat.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2016/05/eng-keskuskauppa
kamarin-naisjohtajaselvitys-2017.pdf.
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have successfully fulfilled the board gender diversity requirements of
their respective jurisdictions. We examined the percentage of female
members in supervisory positions. The EURO STOXX 50 Index was
selected to represent the 50 largest companies among 19 supersectors in
the year 2015, and includes companies from seven Eurozone countries.
The following table gives an overview of the 50 companies that
make up the EURO STOXX index, their sector, country of origin and
the percentage of women on their supervisory boards.
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Table 2: Overview of the 50 EURO STOXX companies from 2015
222
(Information from STOXX).

Nr.

Company'sname

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

AirLiquide
AIRBUSGROUPSE
ALLIANZ
ANHEUSERͲBUSCHINBEV
ASMLHLDG
ASSICURAZIONIGENERALI
AXA
BASF
BAYER
BCOBILBAOVIZCAYAARGENTARIA
BCOSANTANDER
BMW
BNPPARIBAS
CARREFOUR
DAIMLER
DANONE
DEUTSCHEBANK
DEUTSCHEPOST
DEUTSCHETELEKOM
E.ON
ENEL
ENGIE
ENI
ESSILORINTERNATIONAL
FRESENIUS
GRPSOCIETEGENERALE
IBERDROLA
IndustriadeDisenoTextilSA
INGGRP
INTESASANPAOLO
L'OREAL
LVMHMOETHENNESSY
MUENCHENERRUECK
NOKIA
ORANGE
PHILIPS
SAFRAN
SAINTGOBAIN
SANOFI
SAP
SCHNEIDERELECTRIC
SIEMENS
TELEFONICA
TOTAL
UNIBAILͲRODAMCO
UNICREDIT
UNILEVERNV
VINCI
VIVENDI
VOLKSWAGENPREF

Sector

Chemicals
IndustrialGoods&Services
Insurance
Food&Beverage
Technology
Insurance
Insurance
Chemicals
Chemicals
Banks
Banks
Automobiles&Parts
Banks
Retail
Automobiles&Parts
Food&Beverage
Banks
IndustrialGoods&Services
Telecommunications
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Oil&Gas
HealthCare
HealthCare
Banks
Utilities
Retail
Banks
Banks
Personal&HouseholdGoods
Personal&HouseholdGoods
Insurance
Technology
Telecommunications
IndustrialGoods&Services
IndustrialGoods&Services
Construction&Materials
HealthCare
Technology
IndustrialGoods&Services
IndustrialGoods&Services
Telecommunications
Oil&Gas
RealEstate
Banks
Personal&HouseholdGoods
Construction&Materials
Media
Automobiles&Parts

Country

FR
FR
DE
BE
NL
IT
FR
DE
DE
ES
ES
DE
FR
FR
DE
FR
DE
DE
DE
DE
IT
FR
IT
FR
DE
FR
ES
ES
NL
IT
FR
FR
DE
FI
FR
NL
FR
FR
FR
DE
FR
DE
ES
FR
FR
IT
NL
FR
FR
DE

EBT/Total
Percentage
Total
Earnings
no.
of
No.of supervisory
before Employees
Of
Womenon
Women
board
Taxes(Mil
total
Employees
the
members
€)
(in
Board
thousands)
5
2
4
2
3
4
5
3
4
3
4
6
7
4
5
5
7
7
8
2
2
11
1
3
0
7
5
2
2
5
6
4
8
2
6
3
4
6
5
4
5
6
2
4
4
1
6
6
6
3

12
12
13
14
9
10
14
12
20
12
11
20
14
16
20
13
22
20
20
12
6
19
5
16
12
14
13
8
8
19
15
17
20
8
15
9
17
15
14
18
13
20
18
12
11
5
11
15
14
20

41.7%
16.7%
30.8%
14.3%
33.3%
40.0%
35.7%
25.0%
20.0%
25.0%
36.4%
30.0%
50.0%
25.0%
25.0%
38.5%
31.8%
35.0%
40.0%
16.7%
33.3%
57.9%
20.0%
18.8%
0.0%
50.0%
38.5%
25.0%
25.0%
26.3%
40.0%
23.5%
40.0%
25.0%
40.0%
33.3%
23.5%
40.0%
35.7%
22.2%
38.5%
30.0%
11.1%
33.3%
36.4%
20.0%
54.5%
40.0%
42.9%
15.0%

2,490.4
2,359.0
9,763.0
11,482.3
1,856.1
3,293.0
7,521.0
5,297.0
5,254.0
4,428.0
9,172.0
8,706.0
9,790.0
1,673.0
12,280.0
1,925.0
Ͳ6261.0
2,055.0
4,754.0
Ͳ5841.0
5,229.0
Ͳ5262.0
Ͳ3535.0
1,120.0
3,262.0
5,878.0
2,931.3
3,212.7
5,680.0
4,056.0
4,517.4
5,983.0
3,223.0
1,511.0
3,197.0
623.0
Ͳ1355.0
622.0
5,243.0
3,991.0
1,736.0
5,983.0
316.0
3,677.5
2,678.3
1,775.9
7,133.0
3,022.0
1,196.0
Ͳ5688.0

50,000
136,574
142,459
150,000
14,681
70,000
98,279
112,435
116,800
137,968
193,863
122,244
189,077
380,920
284,015
99,771
101,104
497,745
225,243
56,490
67,914
154,950
28,246
61,000
222,305
145,700
30,938
152,854
54,873
90,807
82,900
125,346
43,554
56,690
156,000
112,959
70,087
170,372
115,631
76,986
160,000
348,000
129,890
96,019
1,966
43,479
168,921
185,452
16,395
114,006

49.8
17.3
68.5
76.5
126.4
47.0
76.5
47.1
45.0
32.1
47.3
71.2
51.8
4.4
43.2
19.3
Ͳ61.9
4.1
21.1
Ͳ103.4
77.0
Ͳ34.0
Ͳ125.2
18.4
14.7
40.3
94.7
21.0
103.5
44.7
54.5
47.7
74.0
26.7
20.5
5.5
Ͳ19.3
3.7
45.3
51.8
10.9
17.2
2.4
38.3
1,362.3
40.8
42.2
16.3
72.9
Ͳ49.9

222. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183; EURO STOXX 50 Werte, FINANZEN.NET,
https://www.finanzen.net/index/euro_stoxx_50/werte (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). Information also obtained from the annual reports of all 50 EURO STOXX companies: Air Liquide, Airbus Group SE, Allianz, Anheuser-Busch InBev, ASML Holding,
Assicurazioni Generali, AXA, BASF, Bayer, BCO Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, BCO
Santander, BMW, BNP Paribas, Carrefour, Daimler, Danone, Deutsche Bank,
Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, E.ON, Enel, Engie, Eni, Essilor International,
Fresenius, GRP Société Générale, Iberdrola, Industria de Diseño Textil, ING Group,
Intesa Sanpaolo, L’Oréal, LVMH Moet Hennessy, Münchener Rück, Nokia, Orange, Philips, Safran, Saint Gobain, Sanofi, SAP, Schneider Electric, Siemens, Telefónica, Total, Unibail-Rodamco, UniCredit, Unilever, VINCI, Vivendi, Volkswagen.
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The allocation among different sectors can be seen for each country of
the EURO STOXX 50 index in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The 50 EURO STOXX companies in Europe and their sectors
223
(Source: Information obtained from STOXX).

As shown in Figure 2, the percentage of women is not much higher
in technologically more innovative sectors such as Media (42.86 percent) compared to traditional sectors such as Construction & Materials
(40.0 percent) and Personal & Household Goods (39.36 percent).
Figure 3 shows the number of companies of each country in the
EURO STOXX 50 index. Most EURO STOXX companies are located
in France (20), followed by Germany (14), Spain (5), Italy (5), the
Netherlands (4), Belgium (1), and Finland (1).

223. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183. See supra note 222 for a list of the 50 companies.
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Figure 3: Number of EURO STOXX 50 companies per country (Source:
224
own representation based on the information from STOXX).

Figure 4 shows the percentage of women in supervisory boards in
each of the seven countries, as given by the EURO STOXX companies.
Figure 4: Number of women on the supervisory board of EURO STOXX
companies in 2015 in the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Germany,
Finland and Belgium. (Information with regard to the number of women
on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015 annual reports of the
225
respective companies).

In six of the seven countries, the percentage of women on
supervisory boards in 2015 averaged above 25 percent. In contrast, only
two countries had at least 25 percent female management board

224. Id.
225. See supra note 222 for a list of the 50 companies.
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226

members in 2014. The countries with the highest percentages of
women on supervisory boards are the Netherlands with 36.6 percent
and France with 36.4 percent. Figure 4 shows that, as of 2015, the
expected female quota of 30 percent to 40 percent had not yet been
achieved by EURO STOXX companies.
Germany and France have the greatest number of companies in the
EURO STOXX 50 index, thus we examined the data from these
countries more closely. The frequency distribution in Figure 5 shows
that most of France’s EURO STOXX companies have attained 40
percent female representation. One French company has a percentage of
women approaching 60 percent on its supervisory board (57 percent)
and four French enterprises have supervisory boards comprised of nearly
50 percent women.
Figure 5: Frequency distribution of women on the supervisory board of
French EURO STOXX companies in 2015 (Information with regard to the
number of women on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015
227
annual reports of the respective companies).

Women are less well-represented on Germany’s supervisory boards.
There are no German companies with 50 percent women on its
supervisory board. Two companies reached the highest percentage of

226. Bettina Binder et al., Is Enterprise Success a Women’s Topic?, 9 CONF. OF THE
EUROMED ACAD. OF BUS. 267, 273 (2016).
227. Information obtained from the annual reports of all French EURO STOXX companies: Air Liquide, Airbus Group SE, AXA, BNP Paribas, Carrefour, Danone, Engie,
Essilor International, GRP Société Générale, L’Oréal, LVMH Moet Hennessy, Orange, Safran, Saint Gobain, Sanofi, Schneider Electric, Total, Unibail-Rodamco,
VINCI, Vivendi.
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women on supervisory boards for German enterprises: 40 percent. One
company reached 35 percent and another 32 percent. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of women on the supervisory boards of
German EURO STOXX companies in 2015 (Information with regard to
the number of women on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015
228
annual reports of the respective companies).

Though the above analysis offers a limited view of the percentage
of women on boards at the European level, it can be seen that the
French companies in the EURO STOXX index not only comply with
the regulations, they exceed the requirements. It should also be noted
that Germany’s legal requirements were established later than those of
other European countries. The German EURO STOXX company
boards are made up of between 15 percent and 40 percent women, except one company, Fresenius, which had an all-male supervisory board
in 2015. Some of the Italian and Spanish companies that are part of the
EURO STOXX index still need to increase the number of women on
their boards in order to be compliant with the regulations, while in the
Netherlands, of the four EURO STOXX companies, only one did not
fulfill the quota. Belgium and Finland had one company each in the
2015 EURO STOXX index, thus it is difficult to draw conclusions
about the percentage of women on the supervisory boards of these at the
country level. Gender parity in the boardroom as achieved by some
French companies sends a positive signal showing that barriers to gender
parity can be overcome.

228. Information obtained from the annual reports of all German EURO STOXX companies: Allianz, BASF, Bayer, BMW, Daimler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Post,
Deutsche Telekom, E.ON, Fresenius, Münchener Rück, SAP, Siemens, Volkswagen.
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The main takeaway from analyzing women’s representation on the
corporate boards of the largest European companies as of 2015 is the
effectiveness of the board gender quotas. Though the progress is regarded as slow, gender quotas did trigger adoption of gender-balanced
boards.
C. Japan
As early as the nineteenth century, female Japanese activists have
been striving for female advancement in society, for equality in the
229
workplace, and against gender discrimination. Prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, women were subservient to the patriarchal system in
230
which all power was held by the senior male member of the family.
After 1868, under the influence of Western cultural values, a few legislative changes improved women's lives, such as restricting trafficking in
women, granting divorce rights, and compulsory elementary education
231
for girls. The women's liberation movement generally, and particularly the 1911 Bluestocking (Seito) movement, modeled after the one in
232
Britain, militated against the patrilineal extended family system.
The Western women's liberation movements of the 1960s and
1970s had a considerable impact in Japan, spurring a proliferation of
groups and organizations that demanded equal employment opportunities and pay, sexual liberation, reproductive rights, and equal political
233
representation. These two decades witnessed unprecedented economic
growth and coincided with the establishment of the traditional model of
234
breadwinner-husband and housekeeper-wife. However, in the 1980s,
the novelty of the Japanese economic miracle started to wear off and the
single income model was no longer sustainable for the average family.
Married women began to seek employment, most of which was tempo235
rary or part-time.

229. See SANDRA BUCKLEY, BROKEN SILENCE: VOICES OF JAPANESE FEMINISM 11 (1997).
230. YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 205
(1998).
231. Id.
232. Yasuko Morihara Grosjean, From Confucius to Feminism: The Japanese Woman’s Quest
for Meaning, 11 ULTIMATE REALITY AND MEANING 166 (1988).
233. Elise K. Tipton, Being Women in Japan, 1970-2000, in WOMEN IN ASIA 208, 208
(Louise Edwards & Mina Roces, eds.) (2000).
234. Machiko Matsui, Evolution of the Feminist Movement in Japan, 436 NWSA J. 435,
441 (1990).
235. Id.
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In response to international pressure to eliminate sexual discrimina236
tion, as well as a result of changes in labor market trends, the government passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in
1986, guaranteeing equal employment opportunities for men and wom237
en, and enabling women's access to career-track jobs. Over the following decade, also dubbed “the lost decade,” which marked the beginning
of Japan's economic downturn, a number of victories were achieved on
the feminist front. These were the Childcare Leave Law (1992), the
Nursing Care Insurance Law (1997), the Law to Promote Specified
Nonprofit Activities (1998), the Law for Punishing Acts Related to
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and for Protecting Children
(1999), the Anti-Stalking Law (2000), and the Law for the Prevention
238
of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims (2001). Although
the scope and some of the effects of these laws have been positive in
terms of promoting equality for women, some authors point out that
they were in fact serving politicians’ and businesses’ hidden agendas and
239
contributed to widening the gender divide.
One feminist author, Ayako Kano, contends that the passing of
these laws in the 1990s was a sign that the state was embracing the ideas
240
of feminism. However, scholar Emma Dalton has noted that gender
equality policies envisioning a society “where women shine” can have an
ambiguous effect: they create a polarization not only between men and
women, who must compete for a decreasing number of regular jobs, but
also between a minority of privileged women who can and will benefit
from these measures to advance their careers and the vast majority of
241
women who work in temporary, low paid jobs.
As a signatory to the United Nation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Japan has come
under intense international pressure to tackle the issue of female un-

236. Lorraine Parkinson, Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 604, 619 – 20 (1989).
237. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Koyô no Bun’ya niokeru Danjo
no Kintôna Kikai oyobi Taigû no Kakuhôtô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Securing,
Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment] Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND
WELFARE, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/06-Seisakujouhou-11900000-Koyoukintou
jidoukateikyoku/0000133458.pdf (last visited Jul. 30, 2019).
238. Kano Backlash, supra note 111, at 43.
239. See Emma Dalton, Womenomics,’Equality’ and Abe’s Neo-Liberal Strategy to Make Japanese Women Shine, 20 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 97 – 99 (2017).
240. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 43.
241. Dalton, supra note 239, at 102.
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derrepresentation in leadership positions over the past decade. Apart
from the EEOL, which was revised in 1997 and again in 2005-2006, a
number of initiatives were adopted with the declared aim of promoting
243
women in public positions of influence. These were the Basic Act for
a Gender Equal Society (1999), followed by four Basic Plans for a Gender Equal Society (adopted in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015), and the
Law for the Promotion of Women's Participation and Advancement in
244
the Workplace (in force since April 2016).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law claimed its purpose was
to end any form of gender discrimination against women and to grant
245
equal employment opportunities. Nevertheless, the law was a “double246
edged sword;” although it allowed women greater access to careertrack jobs, it required them to comply with traditionally male working
practices, such as long hours, dangerous conditions, or being reassigned
247
to other parts of the country. The immediate effect of the law was a
further rise in non-regular (part-time, dispatch, temporary) female
workers, as working mothers did not find this “equal employment op248
portunity” solution feasible. Unlike regular jobs, non-regular employment offers substantially lower wages, no advancement prospects,
no job security, and little or no eligibility for some of the benefits of
249
regular workers, such as child care leave. The law was the result of a
242. IWASAWA, supra note 230, at 206.
243. Stephanie Assmann, Gender Equality in Japan: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Law Revisited, ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS (Nov. 2014) at 12,
http://apjjf.org/2014/12/45/Stephanie-Assmann/4211.html (last visited Sep. 14,
2018).
244. Ayako Kano, Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and
Labor, HONOLULU: UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS (2016) https://doi.org/10.21313/
hawaii/9780824855802.001.0001; Ayako Kano, Womenomics and Acrobatics: Why
Japanese Feminists Remain Skeptical About Feminist State Policy, 2 FEMINIST
ENCOUNTERS: A J. OF CRITICAL STUD. IN CULTURE & POL. 1 (2018).
245. Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and
Women in Employment, Act No. 113, Article 6 (1972) (Japan) (“With regard to the
following matters, employers shall not discriminate against workers on the basis of
sex. (i) Assignment (including allocation of duties and grant of authority), promotion, demotion, and training of workers; (ii) Loans for housing and other similar
fringe benefits as provided by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; (iii) Change in job type and employment status of workers; and (iv) Encouragement of retirement, mandatory retirement age, dismissal, and renewal of the labor
contract”).
246. Stephanie Assmann, Gender Equality in Japan: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Law Revisited, 12 ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Nov. 3, 2014, at 16–17.
247. Dalton, supra note 239, at 99.
248. See id. at 99–100.
249. See id.

2019]

WOMEN IN POSITIONS OF CORPORATE LEADERSHIP

321

compromise among three interest groups: conservative politicians, who
supported the traditional view of women as stay-at-home wives and
mothers, business leaders, who were in dire need of a cheap labor force,
250
and feminists, who sought to end sex discrimination. It did little in
the way of promoting women in leadership positions, and thirty years
after the enactment of the law, the number of female leaders remains
251
low.
The Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society (the “Basic Law”), enacted in 1999, was a positive measure toward promoting female leaders
252
in top positions. It can be considered the de facto beginning of Japanese womenomics as it reflects, more than ever before, the government's
253
positive attitude toward acknowledging women's role in society. It
was followed by four Basic Plans for a Gender Equal Society, adopted in
254
2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. The Basic Law encourages employers to
255
establish targets of promoting women in decision-making positions. It
is worth noting, however, that the Japanese name of the Basic Law,
Danjo kyôdô sankaku (੬ુ), which translates literally to
250. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 50 (citing Midori Hotta, Danjo kyoǉdoǉ sankaku
teki akurobatto [Male-Female Co-Participatory Acrobatics], 131 IMPACTION 106
(2002)).
251. Helen Macnaughtan, Womenomics for Japan: Is the Abe Policy for Gendered Employment Viable in an Era of Precarity?, 13 ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Mar. 30, 2015, at
14.
252. See Dalton, supra note 239, at 97.
253. See id.
254. GENDER EQUALITY BUREAU CABINET OFF., BASIC PLAN FOR GENDER EQUALITY
(2010), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/about_danjo/lbp/basic/index.htm;
Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, Women and Men in Japan 2018,
http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamphlet/women-andmen18/index.html (accessed Sept. 16, 2019).
255. See Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78, Article 3 (1999) (Japan) (“The
Formation of Gender Equal Society shall be carried out, aiming at respect for the
dignity of men and women as individuals, not treating men and women in a way that
discriminates against them based on gender, securing opportunities for men and
women as individuals to exercise their abilities and respect for other human rights of
men and women”); see also Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78, Article
5 (1999) (Japan) (“Formation of Gender Equal Society shall be undertaken with the
aim to secure opportunities for men and women to jointly participate as equal members of society in planning and deciding policies of the State or local governments or
ones of private organizations”); Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78,
Article 8 (1999) (Japan) (“The State is responsible for the comprehensive formulation
and implementation of policies on promotion of the Formation of Gender Equal Society (including positive action; the same shall apply hereinafter) pursuant to the
basic principles on the Formation of Gender Equal Society prescribed in Articles 3 to
the preceding Article”); Mari Ôsawa, Government Approaches to Gender Equality in
the Mid-1990s, 3 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 4 (2000).
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“Male-Female Joint Participation Plan,” fails to include the term “equal256
ity,” or byôdô in Japanese. The omission of the term has been interpreted as symptomatic of conservative politicians' wariness of associating
this initiative with the concept of gender equality in the Western sense,
257
which would suppose affirmative action and gender quotas.
In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, cognizant of women’s immense potential to help the Japanese economy recover from decadeslong torpor, pledged to turn Japan into “a place where women shine” by
increasing the proportion of leading positions occupied by women to 30
258
percent by 2020. His womenomics agenda included:
1. increasing female workforce participation for ages 25 to 44
from 68 percent (2012) to 77 percent by 2020;
2. increasing the ratio of women who reenter employment after their first child from 38 percent (2010) to 55 percent
by 2020;
3. increasing female leadership participation to 30 percent by
2020;
4. expanding child care and eliminating child care waiting
lists by 2017; and
5. increasing the number of fathers who take up paternity
259
leave from 2.6 percent in 2011 to 13 percent by 2020.
In April 2014, the Japan Business Federation, the Keidanren, compiled and published an “Action Plan on Women's Active Participation
260
in the Workforce.” It detailed the necessity and expected effects of at261
tracting women to the labor force. It also highlighted problems such
as the lack of continuity and recent changes in female employment patterns, shortage of child care facilities, relocation issues, low female representation in managerial positions, gender stereotypes, male-centered
262
corporate practices, and low numbers of women in the STEM fields.
It cited future initiatives such as disclosure policies, female-targeted career development efforts, changing the attitudes of managers and per256. Ôsawa supra note 255, at 6.
257. Id.
258. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Address at the Sixty-Eighth Session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 26, 2013) (transcript available at
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html).
259. Matsui et al., supra note 133, at 13.
260. Keidanren, Action Plan on Women’s Active Participation in the Workforce (2014),
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2014/029_proposal.pdf.
261. Id. at 2–4.
262. Id.
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sonnel, decreases in working hours, reform of the tax and social security
systems, elimination of child care waiting lists, and encouraging wom263
en's access to STEM fields.
The Basic Law has yielded mixed results. Despite its success in attracting more women into the labor force (50 percent of the total
number and 70 percent of women aged between 15 and 64 as of
264
2018), statistics indicate that half these women are in non-regular
265
employment. The Basic Law did not, however, empower women as it
had promised, as the initial targets of promoting women in leadership
positions failed to be achieved. As one researcher points out, the Basic
Law stemmed less from a real concern for gender parity and more from
the need to pull women into the workforce to solve the demographic
266
crisis and the shortfall of working-age people. Some critics regard the
Basic Law as an attempt to take women from their comfort zone (i.e.
family, child care) and “place them in stressful positions of leader267
ship.” It is seen as an attempt to utilize women for national goals, by
requiring them to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the company, only
to blame them for the dwindling birthrate in case of negative out268
comes.
Subsequently, an Act on Promotion of Women's Participation and
Advancement in the Workplace was adopted and became effective in
269
April 2016. The Act obliges companies with more than 300 employees to set numerical targets and disclose the number and positions of
their female employees as well as the measures they have taken to promote women's active participation in the company’s decision-making
270
process. Feminist researcher Ayako Kano considers this to be a mild
form of a “carrot and stick” approach, with companies assessed accord271
ing to their efforts to promote women. The Act, however, fails to realistically address the problem of gender inequalities with regard to unequal wages and child care burdens falling disproportionately on women.
263. Id.
264. Koji Okuda, Japan’s Female Employment Tops 50% for 1st Time in Half-Century,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Feb. 2, 2019, 06:24 JST), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/
Japan-s-female-employment-tops-50-for-1st-time-in-half-century.
265. Katharina Buchholz, Half of Japanese Female Workers Are Not Employed Full-Time,
STATISTA (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.statista.com/chart/17262/number-of-japanesewomen-working-part-time/.
266. Kano, Womanomics, supra note 244, at 5.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 6.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id. at 2 n.5.
271. Id. at 2.
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Thus, it appears that women are expected to carry single-handedly the
triple burden of a full-time job, the household, and child and elderly
care.
A much-publicized initiative is the target for promoting women in
leadership positions. The initiative, also known as the “30 by 20,” estimated that by the year 2020, 30 percent of the top management positions would be occupied by women. It was first proposed in 2003 during the Koizumi cabinet and was later “appropriated” as one of Abe's
272
main womenomics measures. Nevertheless, on September 30, 2014,
the Labor Policy Council suggested that the target was overly ambitious
273
and should be lowered due to a number of problems. These include
the large number of women employed in non-regular employment (53
percent), insufficient child care facilities, high employment dropout
rates, and little progress in appointing female leaders to decision-making
274
posts (7.5 percent). As a consequence, in 2015, the 30 percent target
was modified to seven percent for middle managerial positions for the
275
central government and 15 percent for the private sector.
The laws and acts discussed above had a rather limited effect in increasing the numbers of female leaders. The explanation may lie in their
failure to convince both employers and employees of the benefits that
would result from promoting more women to positions of responsibility. Corporate employers have been reluctant to take on more female
leaders due to the reasons discussed above: cultural bias, sexist stereotypes, and the negative perception of females in positions of responsibility. It has been pointed out that, "since the late 1980s, the more Japanese policy seems to strive toward gender equality, the more employers'
implementation of policy has served to differentiate the management of
male and female employees, even widening the gap between the sex276
es."

272. Mizuho Aoki, Japan Drastically Lowers Its Goal for Female Managers in Government
and Private Sector, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/12/25/national/japan-drastically-lowers-its-goal-for-female-managers-ingovernment-and-private-sector/.
273. Josei no Katsuyaku Suishin ni muketa Aratana Hôteki Wakugumi no Kôchiku nitsuite (Hôkoku) [L. POL’Y COUNCIL, REPORT ON ESTABLISHING A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING FEMALE PARTICIPATION] (2014), https://www.mhlw.
go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-11902000-Koyoukintoujidoukateikyoku-Koyoukin
touseisakuka/0000059755.pdf.
274. Id.
275. Sophia Yan & Junko Ogura, Japan Slashes Target for Women in Senior Positions,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 7, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/12/07/news/economy/
japan-women-senior-positions/index.html.
276. Macnaughton, supra note 251, at 14.
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In the absence of gender quotas and coercive measures that would
ensure a more egalitarian distribution of women in leadership positions,
corporations continue to use women as a cheap labor force. The present
laws, regulations, and measures do not propose to solve the conundrum
of work-life balance which confronts working women in Japan, but instead add to the burdens of household and child care that women tend
to shoulder alone.
With respect to compliance with the laws and regulations, Table 3
indicates that the proportion of women in decision-making positions in
the public and private sectors in 2016 and 2017 failed to meet even the
lowered targets described above. In the national government and private
sectors, progress has been slow, and it is unlikely that the targets will be
reached by the projected deadline.
Table 3: Women in leadership positions - Targets and current figures
277
(Source: Matsui, et al., Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk).
FIELD

Politics (Government)

Economic Field

Media

Education/Research

Other Professions

POSITION
Diet Members (House of Representatives)
Diet Members (House of Councilors)
Prefectural governors

PROPORTION
(2017)

TARGET
(2020)

PERCENT

PERCENT

10.1

30

20.7

30

6.4

Prefectural civil service directors
Employees in positions equivalent
to section chief in private corporations
Employees in positions equivalent
to department manager in private
corporations

10.4

15

10.9

15

6.3

10

Board directors in listed company

4.1

10

Journalists (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association)

20.2

President, vice-president and Professor at university

16.7

Researchers

16.2

Doctors
Certified public accountants

21.1
15

277. Matsui et al., supra note 133, at 21.

20
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Furthermore, a Teikoku Databank survey conducted in April 2018
among 1.2 million private, non-profit, and public companies to determine the ratio of women in top managerial positions, reveals that accessing leadership positions continues to be a serious challenge for women
278
in major companies dominated by males. Women were found to fare
better in medium- to small-sized companies, especially in those in traditionally “female” sectors, such as child care, beauty care, and educa279
tion. The findings suggest that:
1. The ratio of female CEOs has been growing slowly over the
past 30 years. Thus, at the end of April 2018, 7.8 percent of
companies were led by a female CEO compared to 4.2 percent
in 1998;
2. Unlike male CEOs, most of whom are appointed by promotion or transfer, many of the female presidents inherited their
position;
3. The proportion of female CEOs was highest for small enterprises with sales of under JPY 50 million (USD 463,000) (10.8
percent), but smaller for mid- to large-size companies;
4. The child care business has the highest ratio of female CEOs
(43.2 percent) followed by beauty care and education;
5. According to prefecture, the highest ratios of female CEOs
were found in Aomori (10.6 percent), Okinawa (10.41 per280
cent), Tokushima (10.39 percent), and Saga (10 percent).
As these data indicate, over three decades since the promulgation of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, and five years into Abenomics, Japanese women have not yet been able to shine in leadership positions as much as Japanese Prime Minister Abe promised in 2014.
Moreover, it should be noted that many private companies have
managed to exploit the loopholes in the EEOL to their advantage with281
out incurring penalties. Dr. Emma Dalton criticizes the law as being a
“toothless” compromise between employers and government, which
282
contained no punitive measures against those who violated the law.

278. Teikoku Data Bank, Josei Shachô Hiritsu Chôsa [Special Project: Female President
Ratio Survey] (2018), https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p180504
.pdf.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Id.
281. Assmann, supra note 246, at 7–8.
282. EMMA DALTON, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 35 (2015)..
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Others call the law a “paper tiger,” as it only stipulates mediation proce283
dures to cope with disputes.
The EEOL seems to function more as a set of guidelines rather
than as an enforced policy. The EEOL effectively gave women a false
sense of individual choice and equal competition, deterred many women
from re-entering the workforce, and led to a polarization of working
284
women into elite and non-elite career tracks. One reason is that the
law, in its 1985 form, was said to be “weak and ambiguous,” urging
employers to “endeavor to provide women opportunities equal to those
given men in the areas of recruitment, hiring, job assignment and pro285
motion.” As a result, many employers who opposed the 1985 law
chose to “comply” by introducing a dual track system, comprised of a
career or managerial track (sôgôshoku), which provided training opportunities, higher salary and promotion, and a clerical track (ippanshoku),
286
which offered none of these benefits. Women were generally em287
ployed in clerical jobs. Professor Eunmi Mun considers this dual system, which further contributed to formalizing sex segregation, an exam288
ple of “negative compliance,” where companies “chang[e] their
internal structure in such a way to make it impossible to violate the
289
law.” Her research suggests that one of the reasons gender discrimination has endured even after several revisions of the EEOL is that Japanese companies have constantly sought to circumvent the law by exter290
nalizing female labor.

283. Takashi Araki, Recent Legislative Developments in Equal Employment and Harmonization of Work and Family Life in Japan, 37 JAPAN LAB. BULL., at 11 (April 1998),
https://www.jil.go.jp/english/archives/bulletin/documents/199804.pdf.
284. ANNE STEFANIE ARONSSON, CAREER WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: PURSUING
IDENTITIES, FASHIONING LIVES 9 (Routledge 2015) (discussing Chizuko Ueno, THE
MODERN FAMILY IN JAPAN: ITS RISE AND FALL (2009)).
285. Eunmi Mun, Why the Equal Employment Opportunity Law Failed in Japan, AM.
SOC. ASS’N: WORK IN PROGRESS (Aug 10, 2016), https://workinprogress.oowsection
.org/2016/08/10/why-the-equal-employment-opportunity-law-failed-in-japan/.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Eunmi Mun, Negative Compliance as an Organizational Response to Legal Pressures:
The Case of Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 94 SOC. FORCES 1409,
1409 (June 2016).
289. Mun, Why, supra note 285.
290. Mun, Negative Compliance, supra note 288, at 1430–31. Dr. Mun defines the concept of “externalization” as “changing the internal environment to eliminate sources
of conflict,” which in this case, refers to the introduction of the dual track management system that appeared to comply with the EEOL but allowed gender discrimination. Id. at 1414–15.
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Feminist author Kaoru Yamamoto provides an interesting account
of Japanese culture and its relationship with law, explaining that Japa291
nese equate law with the idea of state-imposed constraint. She argues
that Japanese “obey or disobey a law on the basis of the extent to which
292
it accords with the facts of human existence.” She predicted in 1986
that, like many other laws of foreign inspiration, the EEOL was not
likely to become an immediately effective legal tool against sexual discrimination because it was “not in accordance with the realities of socie293
ty.” She relayed the opinions of a group of major employers, whose
stance was, at that time, “government cannot legislate away mores and
294
customs that are ingrained in the culture.” Nonetheless, although
painstakingly slow, some progress has been achieved. A 2019 Goldman
Sachs report (Report) reveals that most of the non-leadership-related
womenomics policy goals advanced by Prime Minister Abe have been
295
attained. Among these are: a record female participation in the workforce of 71 percent, which surpasses the U.S. (66.1 percent) and the Euro Zone (62.2 percent), generous parental leave benefits, better gender
296
transparency, and labor reforms. Although 56 percent of women are
involved in part-time employment, the authors of the Report hypothesize that an increase of the ratio of full-time female employment would
297
have a greater impact on the Japanese economy. Nevertheless, the
dearth of female leaders remains an area for improvement. The Report
advocates for an increase of women in decision-making positions, pointing to the positive correlation between diverse leadership and corporate
298
performance. Yet, the ratio of female managers (kacho and above) at
listed companies is around 14 percent and only 5 percent occupy posi299
tions on company boards.
Japanese policymakers claim to be committed to closing the gender
gap and ensuring equal participation of women in business, administrative, and professional fields. Starting with former Prime Minister
Jun'ichirô Koizumi who, at the beginning of the 2000s, advocated for

291. Yamamoto Kaoru, Japan’s New Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Real Weapon or
Heirloom Sword?, 1986 BYU L. REV. 865, 866 (1986).
292. Id. at 867.
293. Id. at 868, 882.
294. Id. at 883 (quoting Susan Chira, A Tough Ascent for Japanese Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1985, at F1).
295. See Matsui et al., supra note 133.
296. Id. at 1, 8.
297. Id. at 9.
298. Id. at 11.
299. Id. at 13–14.

2019]

WOMEN IN POSITIONS OF CORPORATE LEADERSHIP

329

300

the merits of women in the workforce, and culminating with Prime
Minister Shinzô Abe who made womenomics the centerpiece of his
301
structural reform program known as Abenomics, it would appear that,
at long last, women are given the credit they deserve. Ayako Kano, however, notes that skeptics are failing to jump on the bandwagon of the
302
hype surrounding Prime Minister Abe's womenomics. Considering
that Prime Minister Abe and the ruling party have a history of criticizing gender equality initiatives as “detrimental to ‘traditional’ cultural
303
values” and as disastrous for birth rates, feminists are skeptical and
denounce them as serving the interests of the government and business304
es by continuing to keep most women in low-wage, insecure jobs.
Feminist scholar Mari Ôsawa argues that the general interest and enthusiasm for gender equality is motivated by the argument that it “is good
305
for business.” Women have yet to see substantial progress with regard
to full time employment, the wage gap, work-life balance, and child
care. Despite some progress, it appears that Japan has a long and bumpy
road ahead.
III. Suggestions for Improving the Pathways for Women to
Obtain Positions of Leadership in Business
Not surprisingly, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for eradicating the glass ceiling for women in business. Yet, each jurisdiction discussed herein may find some guidance from the other jurisdictions, staying attuned to the limitations inherent in its respective laws, regulations,
and culture. This Section offers some suggestions for improving the representation of women in the upper echelons of leadership.

300. See Yuko Nakano, Japan Chair Platform: Among Equals? Women in Japanese Politics,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.: NEWSL. (July 11, 2013), https://www.csis.org/
analysis/japan-chair-platform-among-equals-women-japanese-politics.
301. William Pesek, Japan’s Womenomics Finally Gets a Face, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., (Aug.
21, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-s-womenomics-finallygets-a-face.
302. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 53.
303. Id. at 52-53.
304. See id. at 50.
305. Mari Ôsawa, Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the Mid-1990s, 3 SOC.
SCI. JAPAN J. 3, 4 (2000).
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A. The United States
In the United States, serious reform may need to come from the
private sector. Fortunately, there are some private initiatives underway,
although they often focus on specific industries rather than the economy
306
as a whole. Organizations aiming to promote gender diversity in or307
308
ganizational leadership exist in law enforcement, organized labor,
309
310
finance, and medicine, among others. Some general organizations
also exist, such as the Women’s Leadership Council, to provide re311
sources for women seeking and holding positions in local government.
Some American universities have also promoted female corporate leader312
313
314
ship. For example, Yale, UCLA, and Carnegie Mellon offer educational programs designed specifically to help women advance and suc315
ceed in positions of corporate leadership. Others, such as Rutgers,
316
have set up more general research institutions to study the issue. In
many cases, these institutes and programs are fairly new, likely because
the issue of gender in corporate leadership has only recently come to
317
prominence.
306. See, e.g., Gender Diversity Index, supra note 1 (aiming to increase the percentage of
women on U.S. company boards to 20 percent or greater by 2020).
307. See, e.g., Women’s Leadership Institute, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
http://www.theiacp.org/wli.
308. See, e.g., Barbara Esuoso, New Initiative Takes on Fight for Women’s Leadership in the
(JuLabor Movement, AM. PROSPECT MAG.: TAPPED: THE PROGRESS GRP. BLOG
ly 6, 2017), http://prospect.org/blog/tapped/new-initiative-takes-fight-women
%E2%80%99s-leadership-labor-movement.
309. See, e.g., FIN. WOMEN’S ASS’N, https://fwa.org/.
310. See, e.g., AMERICAN MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N, https://www.amwa-doc.org/.
311. See, e.g., WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.womensleadership
council.org/.
312. Women’s Leadership Program, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., https://som.yale.edu/
programs/executive-education/for-individuals/leadership/womens-leadershipprogram.
313. Women’s Leadership Institute, UCLA ANDERSON SCH. OF MGMT.,
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/executive-education/individual-executives/womensleadership-institute.
314. Leadership for Women Executive Education Programs, TEPPER SCH. OF BUS., CARNEGIE
MELLON U., https://www.cmu.edu/tepper/executive-education/women/index.html.
315. Institute for Women’s Leadership, RUTGERS U., https://iwl.rutgers.edu/.
316. The institute at Rutgers University, for example, states that it is “dedicated to the
study of women and gender, to advocacy on behalf of gender equity, and to the promotion of women’s leadership locally, nationally and globally.” Our Mission: Advancing Women’s Leadership for a Just World, RUTGERS U. INST. FOR WOMEN’S
LEADERSHIP, https://iwl.rutgers.edu/.
317. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., FULFILLING THE PROMISE: HOW MORE WOMEN ON
CORPORATE BOARDS WOULD MAKE AMERICA AND AMERICAN COMPANIES MORE
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As corporate gender diversity has gained more attention in both the
popular and academic press, philanthropic organizations have also
moved to boost female representation in American corporate leadership.
The Rockefeller Foundation announced its “100x25” commitment in
318
2016, and the Wilson Center founded its Global Women’s Leader319
ship Initiative in 2011. Meanwhile, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has led the development of female leadership programs in various
320
fields including education, and specifically targets female-led startups
321
for investment through its programs. As with university initiatives,
most of these programs have been established in the last several decades,
322
and many only within the last ten years.
Case studies of female leadership programs in specific organizations
have garnered significant attention in the academic literature. One
study, examining the Women in Medicine and Health Science
(WIMHS) program at the California Davis School of Medicine found

318.

319.

320.
321.

322.

COMPETITIVE 5 (2012), https://www.fwa.org/pdf/CED_WomenAdvancementon
CorporateBoards.pdf (“Successive crises touching the performance of American corporations have focused increased attention on the board of directors as a unique institution with power to effect change. Those scrutinizing corporate boards see an obvious feature: They are predominately composed of men. In 2011, women occupied
just 16 percent of Fortune 500 board seats. That percentage is far below the percentage of women in the labor force, enrolled in higher education, and graduating with
advanced degrees.”); Kweilin Ellingrud, How Women Leaders Change Company Dynamics, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kweilinellingrud/2019/01/30/how-women-leaders-change-company-dynamics/
#1291f0f34733 (“Would more women in corporate leadership roles – CEOs, presidents, SVPs, managers- make companies more successful and change the culture in
the workplace? These are valid questions after new data outlines the depth of gender
inequality throughout C-Suites and senior management positions in companies
throughout North America.”).
The Rockefeller Foundation Launches “100x25” Campaign to Reach 100 Women CEOs
of the Fortune 500 Companies by 2025, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (May 12, 2016),
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/news-media/13274/.
Global Women’s Leadership Initiative: About, WILSON CTR., https://www.wilsoncenter
.org/about-gwli (“The Global Women’s Leadership Initiative at the Wilson Center is
a unique platform for promoting enduring balance in leadership roles – equipping
women with the skills and tools they need to lead, helping to build lasting mentorships between current and emerging leaders, raising the profile of critical issues across
all sectors and advancing inclusive policies and research.”).
AASA Women in School Leadership Initiative: About, THE SCH. SUPERINTENDENTS
ASS’N, http://www.aasa.org/WomenInSchoolLeadership.aspx.
Polina Marinova, Why Melinda Gates Has Been Funding Female VCs Through Her
Secretive Investment Firm, FORTUNE (May 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/
2018/05/30/melinda-gates-limited-partner-venture-capital/.
E.g. THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 318 (“100x25” founded in 2016);
WILSON CTR., supra note 319 (Global Women’s Leadership Initiative founded in
2011,); Marinova, supra note 321 (launched in 2015).
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that the program’s initiatives led to a “steady increase in the number and
percentage of women faculty and department chairs, as well as a relative323
ly low departure rate for female faculty.” The program included a
comprehensive set of initiatives, involving a variety of networking
events, mentorship and leadership clinics, sessions on public speaking
and salary negotiation, and supporting the work-life balance of partici324
pating individuals. In the ten years following the establishment of the
program, the percentage of female faculty members increased from below 20 percent to around 40 percent, with the proportion of female department heads also rising from fewer than 5 percent to nearly 25 per325
cent, although the authors state that they “cannot determine whether
the increase in the number of female faculty over time is directly related
326
to the WIMHS program.”
In 2009, a case study was conducted on a large engineering firm’s
Women’s Leadership Initiative, which included mentoring and networking programs along with targeted recruiting and “a formal succession planning process that ensures slates are diverse and include at least
327
one woman or person of color.” This study showed that between the
Initiative’s founding in 2003 and the time of the study, the proportion
of female directors increased from 23 percent to 31 percent, executives
from three percent to 18 percent, and project managers from 20 percent
328
to 30 percent. This led to the firm being the first in its industry to
329
earn a Catalyst Award for supporting women in business.
Broader gender equality movements have often pushed work-life
330
balance initiatives to reduce the gender pay gap and to promote wom331
en’s advancement at work. Work-life initiatives may also contribute to
gender equality in leadership. One study posited a general relationship
between aspiration to leadership and work-life balance initiatives and
323. Melissa D. Bauman, Lydia P. Howell & Amparo C. Villablanca, The Women in Medicine and Health Science Program: An Innovative Initiative to Support Female Faculty at
the University of California Davis School of Medicine, 89 ACAD. MED. 1461, 1461
(2014).
324. Id. at 1463.
325. Id. at 1465.
326. Id. at 1464.
327. Meg Ibison & Bob Bailey, Women’s Advancement: One Engineering Firm’s Pathway to
Leadership, 101 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N., 44, 46 (2009).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 50.
330. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AMER.
ECON. REV. 1091 (2014).
331. See, e.g., Rebecca Shambaugh, Are Chore Wars at Home Holding You Back at Work?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/are-chore-wars-at-homeholding-you-back-at-work.
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found that “because the work-life interface poses greater challenges for
women,” “women’s leadership aspiration is more influenced by work332
life initiatives,” although both men and women ultimately benefit333
ed. These studies illustrate that implementation of mentoring and
networking programs as well as family-friendly policies should help
more women rise to the upper levels in organizations and to become
prepared to serve on boards.
In addition, a number of major institutional American investors
have begun considering the issue; State Street, BlackRock, and Vanguard have all announced their support for a range of shareholder pro334
posals on gender diversity. The findings of the national campaign
2020 Women on Boards reveal that “the average number of corporate
board seats held by women on the 2018 Russell 3000 Index has risen to
17.7 percent, up from 16.0 percent, in 2017, but that the “majority of
new, mid-cap and small cap companies continue to go public with just
335
one or no women on their boards.”
Finally, in previous work, Professors Dworkin and Schipani have
advocated mentoring and networking as important pathways for women
336
to rise to positions of corporate leadership. Furthermore, although
gender quotas are unlikely to be legal in the U.S. any time in the near

332. Claudia Fritz & Daan van Knippenberg, Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Impact of Work-Life Initiatives, 57 HUM. RES. MGMT. 855, 855 (2017).
333. Id.
334. Castro, supra note 18.
335. Gender Diversity Index, supra note 1, at 2.
336. Mentoring and networking are shown to be critical to the professional development
that leads to career advancement. A mentor offers the vital guidance, support, and
opportunity to a protégé that allows the protégé to enhance her skills, problem-solve,
and access greater opportunities. See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A.
Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance, 21 PA. J. OF BUS. L.
105 (2018); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken &
Madeline K. Kneeland, Assessing the Progress of Women in Corporate Governance: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 721 (2018); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & Cindy A. Schipani, A Half Century PostTitle VII: Still Seeking Pathways for Women to Organizational Leadership, 23 UCLA
WOMEN’S L. J. 29, 72-75 (2016); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J. OF GENDER &
LAW 83, 118-19 (2013); Cindy A. Schipani, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Angel
Kwolek-Folland & Virginia Maurer, Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of Organizational Leadership: The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, DUKE J. OF
GENDER L. & POLICY 89, 135-36 (2009); Cindy A. Schipani, Terry Morehead
Dworkin, Angel Kwolek-Folland, Virginia Maurer & Marina V. N. Whitman, Women and the New Corporate Governance and Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of
Organizational Leadership, 56 MD. L. REV. 504, 536 (2006).
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future, private firms should make sincere efforts to mentor and promote
qualified women, paying close attention to implicit and unconscious biases that may be in play in their training and selection processes.
B. The European Union
We concur with the European Commission in that “not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of tal337
ent and a loss of economic growth potential.” Though the European
Commission encouraged credible self-regulation by companies to improve gender balance on corporate boards, the proportion of women, as
shown in our analysis of the EURO STOXX companies, remains low.
We consider the introduction of a gender quota a necessary instrument
to implement change. Moreover, “the figures show that it is the legislative measures that result in substantial progress, especially if they are ac338
companied by sanctions.” In addition, it is important to raise awareness that “empowering women means a more efficient use of a nation’s
human capital endowment and that reducing gender inequality enhanc339
es productivity and economic growth.”
The E.U. promotes gender mainstreaming in order to increase
gender equality and to combat discrimination. At the same time it is
worth looking at the causes of female underrepresentation in different
areas of activity. The European Commission’s Special Eurobarometer
465 Gender Equality 2017 report offers an interesting picture on the
opinions and perceptions of E.U. citizens on gender. For instance, 44
percent of respondents believe the most important role of a women is to
take care of her home and family and 43 percent think the most im340
portant role of a man is to earn money. At the same time 87 percent
believe gender equality to be important for companies and for the econ341
omy. Therefore policy makers should ask how these attitudes can be
united in meaningful gender equality measures. It is also worth questioning how much can be changed in a top-down manner, versus in a
down-top manner. A gender quota could be a solution, but without a

337. VċRA JOUROVÁ, EUR. COMM’N, GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS:
EUROPE IS BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING 1 (2016).
338. EUR. COMM’N, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU: PROGRESS
REPORT 13 (2012).
339. WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2015 36 (2015), http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR2015/cover.pdf.
340. EUR. COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 465 GENDER EQUALITY 2017, 4 (2017).
341. Id.
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thorough change of the opinions (gender stereotypes included) and values of the E.U. citizens, any progress will be slow and may be superficial.
C. Japan
Judging by the lack of substantial progress, one can infer that public initiatives have failed to persuade companies of the benefits of promoting women in leadership positions in Japan. The so-called
342
“Eruboshi” certification system, based on the Act of Promotion of
Women's Participation and Advancement in the Workplace, is a measure that appears to have failed in its initial purpose and was instead used
as a public relations instrument. Thus, according to a survey conducted
by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2018, the Eruboshi
certification is perceived more as a means to upgrade a company's image
and attract more prospective employees and less as a recognition of fe343
male leaders' contribution to the prosperity of the company.
On the other hand, among the private initiatives that aim at nurturing and promoting female leadership participation, two notable endeavors should be mentioned. First, the Japanese Women's Leadership
Initiative, founded in 2006 in Boston, provides hands-on experience
344
and training in nonprofit management and leadership development.
The second initiative, TOMODACHI MetLife Women's Leadership
Program, is a Japanese-American public-private partnership started in
Tokyo and Kansai in 2013 and expanded to other major cities (Sapporo, Fukuoka, Naha) in 2014. It seeks to nurture future generations of
female leaders through leadership development training and mentoring
345
with mid-career professional women. The declared goal of these initiatives is to inculcate young Japanese women with leadership qualities and

342. Eruboshi (in English “L-star”) certification is a three-tiered accreditation system
which acknowledges the efforts of private corporations to actively promote women in
leadership and managerial positions.
343. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE (MHLW), DÊTABÊSU RIYÔ KIGYÔ
OYOBI “ERUBOSHI” NINTEI SHUTOKU KIGYÔ NI TAISURU ANKÊTO CHÔSA KEKKA NO
GAIYÔ [SURVEY OF ERUBOSHI-CERTIFIED COMPANIES AND WOMEN’S PROMOTION
DATABASE USERS] 1 (2018).
344. JAPANESE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://jwli.org/about/#mission (last
visted Jul. 22, 2019).
345.. TOMODACHI METLIFE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP PROGRAM, http://usjapan
tomodachi.org/programs-activities/entrepreneurship-leadership/tomodachi-womensleadership-program/ (last visited Jul. 22, 2019).
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educate them on the benefits of increased female agency on Japanese society.
In the past, women would work full-time from high school or college graduation up until age 25, when they dropped out of employment
to have children, and re-entered the workforce around the age of 40,
when their children were grown. As Figure 7 shows, in recent years,
more women are continuing to work well into their thirties or forties,
trying to balance work and family, or even shunning marriage or
childbearing. The tendency is particularly notable through 2014-2016,
which coincides with the debut of Prime Minister Abe's womenomics
and the concerted efforts toward increasing the female workforce.
Figure 7: Women's labor force participation by age group (Source: Bureau of
346
Lab. Statistics).

The increase in the number of women who continue to work well
into their thirties is not just a sign of emancipation, but is interpreted by
some as a sign of increasing precarity. Professor Kumiko Nemoto sees in
Japanese women's apparent rejection of marriage and childbirth a sign
347
of increased gender inequality. And Professor Chelsea Szendi Scheider
points to the recent tendency of replacing full-time workers with contract or temporary workers as a form of “feminization of poverty,” given
that women who work in temporary, contract, or irregular jobs (as of
346. Women’s Labour Force Participation by Age Group, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. img.51
(2017), https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/publicity/book/hlj/html/201712/img/
img_01_51.png.
347. Kumiko Nemoto, Postponed Marriage: Exploring Women’s View of Matrimony and
Work in Japan, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 219, 234 – 35 (2008).
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348

2018, 56 percent of women aged 20 to 65) are most at risk of becom349
ing unemployed. She notes that, while Abe’s “womenomics” is likely
to benefit a select group of women and companies, it does little to improve the situation of working women at the lower end of the employ350
ment scale, who “never get far enough up to glimpse the glass ceiling.”
Ayako Kano shares this view and suggests that neoliberal measures produce winners and losers and that, given the pervasiveness of misogyny
and sexism at all levels, signs that a group of elite women will manage to
351
break through the glass ceiling are scarce.
Scholar Helen Macnaughtan sees a solution in changing political,
corporate, and social mentalities toward acknowledging the needs and
352
aspirations of both women and men. A shift from the model of the
man as the sole breadwinner to one that supports dual-income families,
making parental leave mandatory for working fathers, and providing
sufficient child care facilities would ease women's much-needed return
to the workforce. In addition, encouraging highly educated women into
career-track jobs, employment legislation regarding recruitment and
child care, as well as rigorous gender-balanced targets for recruitment
are just a few of the policies that can be implemented to help tap into
353
the latent potential of women. However, as the current situation
shows, these policies cannot succeed in the absence of fundamental reforms at the level of organizational culture.
Kathy Matsui and colleagues recommend that not only the government but also corporations and society at large become more involved in making changes “without delay” regarding the current status
354
of women in the workforce. They advise that the government offer
more flexible labor contracts instead of the existing regular and nonregular ones, which offer little incentive for women to return to regular
355
employment after childbirth. Moreover, they recommend gender pay
gap disclosures, rectification of breadwinner tax disincentives, introduction of parliamentary gender quotas, and more robust measures of promoting female entrepreneurship, such as offering preferential treatment
to female-owned businesses for government procurement, easing wom-
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en’s access to credit and low-interest loans, as well as mentorship and
356
networking programs. In addition, they stress the necessity of tightening gender diversity disclosure requirements, which at present is not
standardized and is difficult to compare across industries or compa357
nies. Companies should prioritize gender diversity in recruiting, retention and promotion, promote more flexible working environments, shift
the promotion system from the current seniority-based system to a performance-based system, set gender diversity targets, and engage male
358
leaders in initiatives to promote gender diversity.
Furthermore, a departure from rigid hierarchy toward encouraging
a more flexible model of work-life balance and prioritizing efficiency
over long working hours would be beneficial not only for women, but
also for men, who—if given the chance—may wish to work different359
ly. Effective changes call for men's cooperation in equally sharing
360
household chores and child care. Although only three percent of Japanese men took paternity leave in 2017, a positive change has been seen
361
among younger men. Japanese millennials' attitudes have started to
362
turn, as more men are encouraged to spend time with their families.
The Work-Style Reform Bill, enacted in June 2018, seeks to address the
issues of overtime work and quality of life by introducing legal caps on
363
overtime hours. The Premium Friday initiative, adopted in February
2017, encourages companies to allow their workers to leave work at
364
3:00 pm on the last Friday of the month. For true change to take effect, however, Japanese companies should abandon the practice of protecting their core of life-long employed male workers and of slotting
women into temporary, dead-end jobs. Abolition of sexual, maternity,
or power-related harassment is another necessary condition for a more
open and transparent atmosphere in the workplace, and one more con356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
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ducive to mutual respect and cooperation. As Macnaughtan concludes,
“Womenomics will not make any real impact if it cannot challenge or
inspire women and men to give up the status quo or indeed challenge
the increasingly precarious modes of livelihood for both women and
365
men.”
Compared to the U.S. and the E.U., Japan still has a long way to
go in raising awareness of the benefits of having more women on corporate boards, and in nurturing leadership capabilities in young women
with the aim of building a network of women in executive and management roles. It is necessary that universities, public and private organizations, as well as media outlets be proactive in changing the societal
366
perceptions about gender roles and housework sharing.
Conclusion
This examination of three of the most developed economies illustrates that development does not equate to equal opportunity and advancement for women in business. Although Japan, the European Union, and the United States have all seen progress regarding advancement
of women in employment, that progress has been slow and often difficult. At present, women in the E.U. seem to be faring best.
Women working in the E.U. appear to be in a better position both
in terms of the number of women in leadership positions and the diversity of industry and types of companies where they work. This can be
attributed to the legally mandated or recommended quotas for women
in supervisory boards and management. Quotas, however, are not legally feasible in the United States.
Progress for United States women in leadership positions and as
corporate board members has mainly occurred through social pressure
and the rising economic and political power of women. Unfortunately,
there is a tendency toward segregation. Women in management and on
boards tend to be concentrated in “female-specialized” areas.
Japan has seen the least progress toward equality. Whether women
venture out of the similar occupational ghettos or stay within them,
corporations have created insidious dual track career opportunities—
managerial versus clerical—which even further contribute to formalizing
gender segregation. Japan has no legislated quota system and even meeting the state-recommended percentage of women on corporate boards
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lags far behind the goals. Additionally, there is an insufficient pool of
working women to meet them and a low number of women aspiring to
leadership due to the traditional gender role distribution.
Top-down measures and targets cannot resolve these issues without more understanding and acceptance of career women in all walks of
life. Pressure to change will likely come from the necessity to utilize
women's latent potential to further economic development. The more
interaction between women on boards and in management with men in
similar positions, the more women will be seen for their capabilities and
contributions. It is also important to create an environment to bolster
women's career ambitions and aspirations. A powerful way to create this
environment is to provide a mentoring system and significant role models. Another is adopting family-friendly policies such as those in the European Union. These are more likely to happen as more organizations
and leaders recognize the economic benefits that result from women on
boards and in leadership positions. This, in turn, will contribute to
equality and fairness.

